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Groves v. Slaughter

Supreme Court of the United States · 1841 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawState Constitutional InterpretationContractsself-executing constitutiondirectory constitutional provisionMississippi constitutionillegal considerationslave importation

Facts

The note sued on was for $7,000 and was given for the purchase of slaves. The parties agreed that the only defense was the legality of the consideration, and that the slaves had been imported into Mississippi by the plaintiff, as merchandise and for sale, in 1835 and 1836, without any prior agreement with the makers or endorsers of the note. The slaves were not returned or tendered back. The defense relied on a provision of the Mississippi constitution stating that the introduction of slaves into the state as merchandise or for sale should be prohibited from and after May 1, 1833.

Issue

Did the Mississippi constitutional provision itself, without implementing legislation, prohibit the introduction of slaves into Mississippi as merchandise or for sale so as to render a note given for their purchase void for illegal consideration? A preliminary question was whether Mississippi decisions had already fixed a binding construction of that provision.

Rule

Where a state constitutional provision announces that certain conduct shall be prohibited at a future date but does not itself provide the means, penalties, or sanctions necessary for enforcement, and its structure and surrounding legislation indicate reliance on legislative implementation, the provision is directory to the legislature rather than a self-executing prohibition. In that circumstance, contracts made before implementing legislation are not void on the ground that they violate the constitutional provision alone.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In 2018, the Constitution of Franklin was amended to state: "After January 1, 2019, payday-lending storefronts shall be prohibited." The provision includes no penalties, no enforcement body, and no statement about the validity of related contracts. In March 2019, Elena Ruiz signed a repayment note in Columbus, Ohio, to Blue Cedar Finance, a fictional lender operating such a storefront, and later argued the note was void because the constitution itself made the loan illegal.

If a court follows the majority's approach, what is the strongest reason to reject Elena's argument?

Explanation. The majority treated a constitutional clause stating conduct "shall be prohibited" as directory rather than self-executing where the text contemplated future action and lacked the penalties, sanctions, and legal consequences needed for full operation. Under that reasoning, a contract made before implementing legislation is not void merely because the constitution announced a policy against the conduct. The other choices add rules the majority did not adopt.