Hammer v. Dagenhart

Supreme Court of the United States · 1918 · Constitutional Law

247 U.S. 251 (1918)

Overruled by United States v. Darby (1941)

Updated July 29, 2026

Constitutional LawCommerce ClauseTenth AmendmentFederalismChild Laborinterstate commerceproduction is not commercelocal police power

Facts

Congress enacted a statute barring shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of goods produced in certain facilities that had employed children within specified age and hour limits during the preceding thirty days. The plaintiff father and his two minor sons, who worked in a cotton mill in Charlotte, North Carolina, sought to stop enforcement of the statute. One son was under fourteen and the other was between fourteen and sixteen. The challenged law applied to goods made in factories where children under fourteen had been employed, or where children aged fourteen to sixteen had worked excessive hours or prohibited times.

Issue

Whether Congress, under its power to regulate commerce among the states, may prohibit the interstate shipment of manufactured goods because they were produced in factories or mines that employed children in violation of federal age and hour standards.

Rule

The commerce power permits Congress to regulate interstate transportation and its incidents, but it does not extend to the production of goods within a state merely because those goods are intended for interstate shipment. Manufacture and mining are not commerce, and Congress may not, by prohibiting shipment of ordinary harmless goods, invade matters of local production and labor regulation reserved to the states.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Congress enacts a statute forbidding interstate shipment of wooden chairs made in any factory that, during the previous 20 days, required employees to work more than 10 hours a day. Pine Harbor Furnishings in Grand Rapids, Michigan manufactures ordinary household chairs and sells many of them to retailers in Indiana and Ohio.

If Pine Harbor challenges the statute, how should a court applying the majority's reasoning rule?

Explanation. Under the majority's rule, manufacturing is not commerce, even when the goods are intended for interstate shipment. Congress may regulate interstate transportation and its incidents, but may not prohibit shipment of ordinary harmless goods as a means of dictating labor conditions inside factories. The statute's necessary effect is to regulate local production, a matter reserved to the states.