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Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman

Supreme Court of the United States · 1982 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawStandingFair Housing ActStatute of LimitationsArticle III standinginjury in facttester standingFair Housing Act

Facts

Havens Realty and an employee were alleged to have engaged in racial steering at two apartment complexes in Henrico County, Virginia. Black tester Coleman alleged that on several occasions she was falsely told no apartments were available while white testers were told vacancies existed; white tester Willis alleged he was told apartments were available. Coleman and Willis also alleged they were deprived of the social and other benefits of living in an integrated community, and HOME alleged that the steering practices frustrated its counseling and referral services and forced it to devote significant resources to counteract the discrimination. The complaint was filed in January 1979, and most of Coleman's tester incidents occurred more than 180 days before filing, while another alleged steering incident involving Coles occurred within 180 days.

Issue

Whether Coleman, Willis, and HOME had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act, and whether their claims were barred by § 812(a)'s 180-day limitations period. More specifically, the Court considered tester standing, neighborhood-based standing, organizational standing, and whether a continuing pattern of racial steering could make the suit timely.

Rule

Congress intended standing under Fair Housing Act § 812 to extend to the full limits of Article III, so the only standing requirement is injury in fact. A person who is the object of a discriminatory misrepresentation prohibited by § 804(d) suffers cognizable injury even if he or she was acting as a tester and had no intent to rent or buy. An organization has standing in its own right when discriminatory practices perceptibly impair its activities and drain its resources. For limitations purposes, when a plaintiff challenges an unlawful practice that continues into the 180-day period, the complaint is timely if filed within 180 days of the last asserted occurrence of that practice; but discrete tester misrepresentation claims are timed from the individual misrepresentation itself.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Cleveland, Maya Reed, a Black fair-housing tester for Lakefront Access Project called Ridgeview Manor and asked whether any one-bedroom units were available. The leasing agent falsely told her none were open, but later that day told a white tester that two one-bedroom units were available. Maya never intended to rent an apartment there.

Does Maya have standing to sue for damages under the Fair Housing Act based on that exchange?

Explanation. The majority held that § 804(d) creates an enforceable right in any person to truthful information about housing availability. A tester who personally receives a discriminatory misrepresentation suffers the precise injury the statute forbids, which satisfies Article III injury in fact. No bona fide intent to rent is required for a § 804(d) misrepresentation claim.