Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County

Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 · Criminal Procedure

542 U.S. 177 (2004)

Updated July 27, 2026

Criminal ProcedureFourth AmendmentFifth AmendmentTerry stopsstop and identify statutesTerry stopreasonable suspicionstop and identify

Facts

A Nevada deputy responded to a report that a man had assaulted a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on a roadside. At the scene, the deputy found a man standing by the truck, a young woman sitting inside, and skid marks suggesting the truck had stopped suddenly; the man appeared intoxicated. While investigating, the deputy repeatedly asked the man for identification and explained he needed to find out who he was and what he was doing there, but the man refused 11 times and taunted the officer to arrest him. The man, later identified as Larry Dudley Hiibel, was arrested and convicted under Nevada law for obstructing an officer by refusing to identify himself during a lawful stop.

Issue

Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a State to require a person lawfully stopped under Terry to disclose his name, and whether punishing refusal to do so violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. More specifically, the question was whether Nevada could criminalize refusal to identify oneself during a valid investigative stop.

Rule

During a valid Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion, a State may require a suspect to disclose his name if the request for identification is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. The Fourth Amendment is satisfied when the identification requirement does not alter the nature, duration, or location of the stop, and the Fifth Amendment bars compelled disclosure only when stating one's name presents a reasonable and appreciable danger of incrimination.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Tulsa, an officer sees Dana Mercer sitting on a park bench near a closed store late at night. The officer has no report of crime, observes no suspicious conduct, and admits he stopped Dana only because the area has had burglaries in the past. Under an Oklahoma statute, the officer orders Dana to state her name, and she refuses.

If Dana is prosecuted for refusing to identify herself, what is the strongest constitutional argument against the prosecution under the majority's reasoning?

Explanation. The majority held that a State may require disclosure of a name only during a valid Terry stop. A Terry stop must be justified at its inception by reasonable suspicion based on specific, objective facts. Without a lawful stop, punishing refusal to identify would violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court did not hold that identity can never be required, that asking for a name is automatically an arrest, or that the Fifth Amendment always bars disclosure.