Kolender v. Lawson

Supreme Court of the United States · 1983 · Criminal Law

461 U.S. 352 (1983)

Updated August 1, 2026

Criminal LawvaguenessDue Process ClauseFourteenth Amendmentvoid for vaguenessarbitrary enforcementcredible and reliable identificationstop-and-identify

Facts

California Penal Code § 647(e), as construed by the California Court of Appeal, required a person who loiters or wanders and is lawfully stopped under Terry standards to provide a "credible and reliable" identification and to account for his presence to the extent it assists in producing such identification. Lawson was detained or arrested about 15 times under the statute between March 1975 and January 1977, though he was prosecuted only twice and convicted once. The California Court of Appeal in People v. Solomon defined "credible and reliable" identification as identification carrying reasonable assurance of authenticity and providing a means to get in touch with the person later. At oral argument, the State confirmed that a suspect violates the statute unless the officer is satisfied that the identification is reliable.

Issue

Whether California Penal Code § 647(e), as construed to require a person stopped under Terry standards to provide "credible and reliable" identification, is unconstitutionally vague on its face under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, the question was whether the statute failed to provide sufficient standards for what a suspect must do to satisfy the identification requirement and thereby encouraged arbitrary enforcement.

Rule

A penal statute is void for vagueness if it fails to define the prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what is required or prohibited, and if it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement so as to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In the criminal context, the more important vagueness concern is the absence of standards that constrain police discretion.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Seattle enacts a misdemeanor ordinance providing that any person lawfully stopped on reasonable suspicion must furnish "trustworthy identification" sufficient to satisfy the officer that the person can be contacted later. Omar Vega is stopped while walking near a closed warehouse district and gives his full name and home address, but the officer arrests him because the answers do not seem trustworthy enough.

If Omar brings a facial due process challenge to the ordinance, what is the strongest argument that the ordinance is unconstitutional?

Explanation. The majority held that a penal statute is facially vague when it does not describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do to comply and instead leaves compliance to the officer's moment-to-moment judgment. The key defect is the absence of standards constraining police discretion, not merely lack of notice. An ordinance requiring "trustworthy identification" that is sufficient only if the officer is satisfied closely raises that same arbitrary-enforcement problem.