In re Marriage of Winegard

Supreme Court of Iowa · Family Law
Family Lawcommon law marriagedivorceantenuptial agreementsalimonyattorney feescollateral attackestoppel

Facts

Sally Winegard sought dissolution of an alleged common law marriage to John Winegard. John argued Sally lacked capacity to marry because two earlier Nevada divorces were jurisdictionally defective, and he also claimed no common law marriage existed and that an antenuptial agreement barred alimony or a property settlement. The record showed John had financially aided and encouraged Sally in obtaining at least the second Nevada divorce, had treated the divorce as valid for years, and had lived with Sally continuously while allowing and participating in public representations that they were husband and wife. The trial court entered protective orders limiting discovery into corporate tax returns, awarded Sally $75,000 in lieu of alimony, and awarded $10,000 toward attorney fees.

Issue

Whether John could collaterally attack Sally's Nevada divorces to deny her capacity to enter a common law marriage, whether the evidence established a common law marriage, whether the antenuptial agreement could bar alimony or a lump-sum substitute, and whether the trial court's financial and fee awards were adequate. The court also considered whether the protective orders required reversal.

Rule

A party may be precluded by estoppel and laches from attacking a foreign divorce when that party knew of the alleged defect, encouraged or aided the divorce, treated it as valid, and later sought to challenge it only when advantageous. In Iowa, a common law marriage requires (1) intent and agreement in praesenti by both parties to be married, (2) continuous cohabitation, and (3) public declaration that the parties are husband and wife. Provisions of antenuptial agreements limiting or barring alimony are void as against public policy, and a lump-sum award in lieu of alimony may be made without a precise stock valuation where the record adequately shows the obligor's substantial wealth.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

  • The court's holding and reasoning
  • Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
  • 10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case
Sign up free to see more →
Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Mira Dalton obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada while living briefly in Reno. Her partner, Evan Pike of Des Moines, paid for the trip, helped her gather papers, and later signed a draft guest list for a planned wedding with her. Six years later, after their relationship ends and Mira claims they formed a common law marriage in Iowa, Evan argues the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction so Mira never had capacity to marry.

How should an Iowa court most likely rule on Evan's challenge to the Nevada divorce?

Explanation. The majority held that even where full faith and credit does not automatically foreclose review of an ex parte foreign divorce, a party who knew of the alleged defect, aided or encouraged the divorce, treated it as valid, and later changed position to the other party's prejudice may be precluded by estoppel and laches from collaterally attacking it. Evan's assistance, later reliance, and delay make the attack barred. (Derived from In re Marriage of Winegard (n.d.).)