In a paternity and child support trial, the jury panel initially included 12 males and 24 females. After for-cause excusals, the State used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes against male jurors, while petitioner used all but one of his strikes against female jurors, resulting in an all-female jury. Before the jury was empaneled, petitioner objected that the State had struck male jurors solely because of gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The trial court rejected the objection, and the jury found petitioner to be the father and the court ordered child support.
Issue
Does the Equal Protection Clause forbid a state actor from exercising peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender? More specifically, does Batson's prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes extend to intentional gender discrimination in jury selection?
Rule
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender. As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination; if that showing is made, the striking party must offer a gender-neutral explanation based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the explanation may not be pretextual.
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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a state civil fraud trial in Phoenix, counsel for the state licensing board uses seven of eight peremptory strikes against men. When opposing counsel objects, the board's lawyer says men are generally more inclined to identify with an aggressive male entrepreneur accused of cutting corners.
How should the trial court rule?
Explanation. The Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender in the exercise of peremptory challenges. The majority held that gender may not be used as a proxy for juror competence or impartiality, and stereotypes that men will favor a male party are not an adequate justification. The rule applies in civil as well as criminal proceedings, and it protects excluded jurors and litigants regardless of whether the targeted gender is a minority on the panel.