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Kadic v. Karadžić

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 1995 · Civil Procedure
Alien Tort ActTorture Victim Protection Actsubject-matter jurisdictionpersonal jurisdictionservice of processpolitical question doctrineAlien Tort ActATS

Facts

Plaintiffs, Croat and Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, alleged that Bosnian-Serb military forces committed rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, summary execution, and other atrocities as part of a genocidal campaign during the Bosnian civil war. They alleged that Karadžić, as President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska, directed these systematic abuses and exercised command authority over the forces that committed them, either as head of Srpska or in collaboration with Yugoslavia and Serbia. Plaintiffs invoked the Alien Tort Act, the Torture Victim Protection Act, and federal-question jurisdiction. Karadžić was allegedly personally served in Manhattan while visiting the United States as an invitee of the United Nations.

Issue

Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act and related statutes over claims alleging genocide, war crimes, and other atrocities committed by Karadžić, including where some claims were asserted against him as a private individual rather than a state actor. The court also considered whether Karadžić was immune from service of process because he was in the United States as a U.N. invitee, and whether the suit presented a nonjusticiable political question.

Rule

Under the Alien Tort Act, federal jurisdiction exists when an alien sues for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations, and the complaint must adequately plead an actual violation of well-established, universally recognized norms of international law. Some international law norms, including genocide and war crimes, bind private individuals as well as state actors, while torture and summary execution outside the genocide or war-crimes context require state action. State action may be shown either by proving that the relevant entity satisfies the international-law definition of a state or by showing that the defendant acted in concert with a recognized foreign state under color-of-law principles analogous to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Lina Omer, a citizen of Sudan now living in Canada, sues Darius Vekic in federal court in New York. She alleges that Vekic, while leading a privately organized ethnic movement in western Sudan, ordered killings, forced pregnancies, and severe beatings intended to destroy a religious minority in part.

Assuming the complaint otherwise satisfies the statute’s alien-and-tort requirements, is federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute most likely proper?

Explanation. Jurisdiction is proper if the complaint adequately pleads an actual violation of a well-established, universally recognized norm of international law. The majority held that genocide is such a norm and that it applies to private individuals as well as state actors. Therefore, alleged genocidal acts by a private movement leader can fall within the Alien Tort Statute even without state action.