Lance v. Dennis

United States District Court for the District of Colorado · 2006 · Federal Courts
Federal Courtsstandingissue preclusionElections ClauseRooker-Feldmancollateral estoppelprivityfull and fair opportunity

Facts

The suit arose out of Colorado's post-2000 census congressional redistricting dispute, in which a state court adopted a 2002 plan after the General Assembly failed to enact one in time, and the General Assembly later passed a different plan in 2003. In People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado Constitution permitted redistricting only once per decade and therefore invalidated the 2003 legislative plan. The Lance plaintiffs then sued, alleging that conducting congressional elections under the court's plan instead of the General Assembly's plan violated Article I, Section 4 by denying them the right to vote in districts authorized by the Elections Clause. Their separate Petition Clause claim had already been dismissed for failure to state a claim and was not before the court on remand.

Issue

Whether private citizens challenging Colorado's use of the court-ordered redistricting plan had Article III standing to assert an Elections Clause claim, and if so, whether that claim was barred by Colorado issue preclusion because the same underlying Elections Clause issue had already been litigated and decided in Salazar.

Rule

A plaintiff may have Article III standing by alleging a nonfrivolous injury to a judicially cognizable voting interest even if the specific constitutional source of the asserted right ultimately fails on the merits. Under Colorado law, issue preclusion applies when (1) the identical issue was actually litigated and necessarily adjudicated in a prior proceeding, (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding, (3) the prior proceeding ended in a final judgment on the merits, and (4) that party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
A group of registered voters in Phoenix, Arizona sues the Arizona secretary of elections in federal court. They allege that congressional elections are being held under a map adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court rather than under a later map enacted by the state legislature, and they claim this injures their interest in voting in districts authorized by the Elections Clause.

The secretary moves to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing that the Elections Clause does not create any personal right belonging to voters. How should the court rule under the majority's approach?

Explanation. The majority held that standing and merits must not be conflated. The relevant question is whether plaintiffs allege a nonfrivolous injury to a judicially cognizable interest. Voting is a judicially cognizable interest, so the possibility that the Elections Clause does not actually confer the specific right asserted goes to the merits, not standing. (Derived from Lance v. Dennis (n.d.).)