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Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2004 · Constitutional Law

CopyrightDMCAComputer ProgramsIdea-Expression DichotomyMergerScenes a fairePreliminary Injunctioncomputer programs

Facts

Lexmark's toner cartridges contained a small program called the Toner Loading Program, and its printers contained a separate Printer Engine Program. Lexmark also used an authentication sequence and a checksum operation so that printers would reject unauthorized cartridges; SCC sold a SMARTEK chip that mimicked Lexmark's chip, satisfied the authentication sequence, and contained an identical copy of the Toner Loading Program. Lexmark claimed SCC infringed copyright by copying the Toner Loading Program and violated the DMCA by trafficking in a device that circumvented access controls to both the Toner Loading Program and the Printer Engine Program. The district court found Lexmark likely to succeed on all claims and entered a preliminary injunction.

Issue

Whether Lexmark showed a likelihood of success on its claims that SCC infringed copyright by copying the Toner Loading Program and violated DMCA § 1201(a)(2) by trafficking in a device that circumvented technological measures controlling access to the Toner Loading Program and Printer Engine Program. More specifically, the case asked whether the Toner Loading Program was likely copyrightable given functional and compatibility constraints, and whether Lexmark's authentication sequence effectively controlled access to the Printer Engine Program within the meaning of the DMCA.

Rule

A computer program is copyrightable only to the extent it contains original expression rather than an idea, process, method of operation, or expression dictated by merger, scenes a faire, compatibility, functionality, or efficiency constraints. In evaluating copyrightability, courts must ask whether alternative expressions are practically feasible under real-world constraints, not merely theoretically imaginable. Under DMCA § 1201(a)(2), a technological measure effectively controls access to a work only when it actually controls access to the copyrighted work itself; the statute does not naturally apply where the work's literal code is otherwise readily accessible even if the measure restricts one way of using the device containing the work.

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North Ridge Medical Devices in Cleveland embeds a 48-byte calibration program in disposable sensor pods used by its analyzers. A rival, Lakefront Rebuilds, copies the program exactly after its expert shows the analyzer accepts only a fixed instruction set, a fixed byte length, and only highly efficient code that fits the pod's memory, while North Ridge responds that dozens of different programs could theoretically perform calibration.

If North Ridge seeks a preliminary injunction for copyright infringement, which argument most strongly undermines its likelihood of success?

Explanation. The governing rule is that a computer program is copyrightable only to the extent it contains original expression, not material dictated by functionality, efficiency, or compatibility constraints. The key inquiry is not whether alternatives can be imagined in the abstract, but whether feasible alternatives practically exist under actual constraints. Thus, evidence of only theoretical alternatives undermines copyrightability and therefore North Ridge's likelihood of success.