Lifson v. City of Syracuse

New York Court of Appeals · 2011 · Torts
17 N.Y.3d 492
Updated
tortsnegligenceemergency doctrinejury instructionssun glaresudden and unexpected circumstancequalifying emergencyharmless error

Facts

Klink struck Irene Lifson with his car while making a left turn onto Harrison Street after work. He testified that, after stopping and beginning his turn, he looked back to his left and was suddenly blinded by sun glare, saw Lifson only a fraction of a second before impact, and could not avoid hitting her despite braking. There was pedestrian traffic in the area between the MONY Towers and a nearby garage, and Klink had noticed pedestrians crossing to his left before turning. There was no evidence that Lifson darted into the street or that Klink was speeding.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the emergency doctrine based on Klink's claim that he was temporarily blinded by sun glare while turning west in the late afternoon. Also, whether any error in giving that instruction was harmless.

Rule

An emergency instruction is warranted only if a reasonable view of the evidence shows that the actor was confronted with a sudden and unexpected circumstance, not of the actor's own making, that left little or no time for thought or caused the actor to make a speedy decision without weighing alternatives. The trial judge must make that threshold determination, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the charge. Under the circumstances here, sun glare at sunset while turning west is not a sudden and unexpected circumstance.

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Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Phoenix, Nora Patel left work at 5:10 p.m. on a clear evening and turned west onto a one-way street lined with office buildings and parking lots. She knew many employees regularly crossed midblock there. Mid-turn, she said the low setting sun suddenly blinded her, and she struck Owen Marks, who was already crossing the street.

Should the trial judge give Nora an emergency doctrine instruction?

Explanation. An emergency charge is warranted only when a reasonable view of the evidence shows a sudden and unexpected circumstance not of the actor’s own making that leaves little or no time for thought. The majority held that, under comparable circumstances, sun glare from the setting sun while heading west is a well-known condition that should be anticipated, not a qualifying emergency. Nora’s awareness of pedestrian traffic further undercuts any claim that the condition was unexpected. (Derived from Lifson v. City of Syracuse (n.d.).)