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McNeil v. Wisconsin

Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 · Criminal Procedure

Criminal ProcedureRight to CounselMirandaSixth AmendmentFifth Amendmentcustodial interrogationMiranda warningsEdwards rule

Facts

McNeil was arrested in Nebraska on a Wisconsin warrant for an armed robbery in West Allis. After he was returned to Wisconsin, he appeared before a court commissioner on that robbery charge and was represented there by a public defender. Later, while in custody, officers questioned him about separate Caledonia crimes; before each interview they gave Miranda warnings, and he signed waivers and made incriminating statements. At the time of those statements, he had been formally charged only with the West Allis robbery, not the Caledonia offenses.

Issue

Does an accused's invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a judicial proceeding on a charged offense also constitute an invocation of the Miranda-Edwards right to counsel, thereby barring police-initiated custodial interrogation about unrelated, uncharged offenses unless counsel is present?

Rule

No. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific and attaches only after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings for a particular offense; its invocation does not, by itself, amount to an invocation of the non-offense-specific Miranda-Edwards right to counsel. Edwards applies only when the suspect has expressed a desire for the assistance of counsel in dealing with custodial interrogation by police.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, Marcus Velez was formally charged with aggravated assault and appeared before a magistrate, where he asked for appointed counsel. Two days later, while still in jail, detectives advised him of his Miranda rights and questioned him about a separate, uncharged warehouse arson in Mesa. Marcus signed a waiver and made incriminating statements about the arson.

Are Marcus's arson statements inadmissible solely because he requested counsel at the earlier court appearance on the assault charge?

Explanation. The controlling rule is that invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a judicial proceeding does not, by itself, amount to an invocation of the Miranda-Edwards right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right is offense specific and had attached only to the charged assault. Unless Marcus expressed a desire for counsel in dealing with custodial interrogation by police, Edwards was not triggered, so his Miranda waiver for the uncharged arson was not invalid solely on that theory.