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Miller v. French

Supreme Court of the United States · 2000 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawPLRAautomatic stayprospective reliefinjunctionsprison conditionsseparation of powersArticle III

Facts

This prison-conditions litigation began in 1975 and resulted in an ongoing injunction governing conditions at Indiana's Pendleton Correctional Facility. In 1996 Congress enacted the PLRA, which permits termination of prospective prison-conditions relief unless it satisfies narrow-tailoring findings and provides that a motion to terminate 'shall operate as a stay' beginning 30 days after filing, extendable to 90 days for good cause, until the court rules. In 1997 the State filed a motion to terminate the Pendleton injunction under the PLRA. The prisoners then sought and obtained an injunction preventing the automatic stay from taking effect, arguing that the stay provision was unconstitutional.

Issue

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2) permits a district court to use its equitable powers to enjoin the PLRA's automatic stay, and if not, whether the automatic stay provision violates separation of powers principles by suspending or reopening a judicial judgment or prescribing a rule of decision.

Rule

Section 3626(e)(2) unambiguously makes the PLRA automatic stay mandatory and precludes federal courts from exercising equitable discretion to enjoin its operation. Congress does not violate separation of powers by changing the law governing continuing prospective relief and requiring a stay of relief that is no longer enforceable under the new standards; such legislation does not reopen a final Article III judgment or prescribe an unconstitutional rule of decision when it merely implements amended substantive standards for ongoing injunctions.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
A federal statute governing ongoing school-reform injunctions provides that any motion to terminate prospective relief "shall operate as a stay" beginning 45 days after filing and ending when the district court enters a final order. In a long-running case in Cleveland, Judge Elena Torres concludes that immediate implementation of the stay would be unfair and enters an order preserving the injunction until she can hold a full evidentiary hearing.

Under the majority's reasoning, is Judge Torres's order most likely valid?

Explanation. The majority held that when Congress unambiguously provides that a termination motion "shall operate as a stay" during a defined interval, the stay is mandatory and courts may not "stay the stay" through general equitable authority. The statute need not use special magic words beyond a clear command. Allowing the judge to preserve the injunction would convert mandatory language into discretionary language.