Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin · 1996 · Contracts

ContractsSpecific performanceStays pending appealCivil contemptInjunction bondsspecific performanceRule 62(c)Rule 62(d)

Facts

LeSea owned Channel 55 and had agreed to sell it to CNI, but the court previously ordered LeSea specifically to perform its contract with Miller instead and permanently enjoined the sale to CNI. Miller sought contempt because LeSea had not completed the sale to him and had filed an FCC application to move the station's transmitter and tower. LeSea responded that FCC approval was required before any sale could be completed and that Miller had not begun that process, while Miller asserted he needed LeSea's signature on FCC forms and an executed sale agreement to do so. Miller had earlier posted a $100,000 bond as security for a preliminary injunction.

Issue

Whether LeSea should be held in contempt for not yet completing the sale to Miller and for filing the FCC application, whether Miller's Rule 65(c) bond should remain in place after entry of a permanent injunction, and whether LeSea was entitled to a stay pending appeal of the specific-performance judgment. More specifically, the court had to decide whether a stay of specific performance falls under Rule 62(d)'s automatic stay provision or Rule 62(c)'s discretionary stay standard.

Rule

Civil contempt requires violation of a clearly articulated court command proved by clear and convincing evidence, and contempt may be found when a party is not reasonably diligent in attempting to comply. A bond posted under Rule 65(c) for a preliminary injunction is not a supersedeas bond and need not continue after the preliminary injunction has been replaced by a permanent injunction absent authority requiring security for the permanent injunction. A stay of a specific performance judgment pending appeal is governed by Rule 62(c), not Rule 62(d), because specific performance is an order to do rather than an order to pay; under Rule 62(c), the court considers likelihood of success on appeal, irreparable injury absent a stay, injury to other parties, and the public interest.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Denver, Nora Bennett won a final judgment ordering Front Range Estates, LLC to specifically convey a parcel of mountain land to her under a purchase contract. Front Range filed a notice of appeal and immediately argued that by posting a supersedeas bond it was entitled to an automatic stay of the conveyance order.

How should the court classify the requested stay?

Explanation. A decree of specific performance is an order to do rather than an order to pay, so it is treated as more analogous to injunctive relief than to a money judgment. Under the majority opinion, a stay pending appeal of such an order is analyzed under Rule 62(c), not as an automatic stay under Rule 62(d). (Derived from Miller v. LeSea Broadcasting, Inc. (n.d.).)