Owens v. Truckstops of America, Inc.

Supreme Court of Tennessee · 1996 · Torts

Tortscomparative faultjoint tortfeasorsstrict products liabilitycontributionindemnitystatutes of limitationsthird-party practice

Facts

Plaintiff alleged that on September 14, 1987, he was injured when a stool in Truckstops' restaurant broke and he fell. He filed suit against Truckstops alone on the last day of the one-year limitations period, asserting only negligence for failure to maintain the stool safely and failure to warn. Truckstops later filed a third-party complaint against Vitro, which designed and manufactured the stool, and Michael, which sold the stool to Truckstops, asserting negligence, strict liability in tort, and breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and seeking indemnity or contribution. After McIntyre was decided and after Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was enacted, plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint to add Vitro and Michael, even though nearly six years had passed since his injury.

Issue

In a transitional case where the plaintiff's injury occurred before McIntyre, how should comparative fault principles apply among the original defendant and third-party defendants, and may the plaintiff add time-barred parties under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119? The case also asked whether Truckstops could still pursue contribution or indemnity against the manufacturer and seller, and how liability should be allocated on negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty theories.

Rule

In transitional cases pending when McIntyre was decided, comparative fault principles apply to the extent they can be used without substantial injustice, with fairness and efficiency controlling. A plaintiff whose claims against additional parties were already barred before Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was enacted cannot revive those claims, because expiration of the statute of limitations gives the potential defendant a vested right not to be sued. For separate, independent negligent acts, tortfeasors are severally liable in proportion to fault, and contribution may be used in a transitional case to achieve that apportionment; active-passive negligence indemnity is subsumed into comparative fault. In strict products liability, defendants in the chain of distribution are treated as a single unit for fault allocation and remain jointly and severally liable for the percentage of damages caused by the defective product, with contribution and indemnity governing the ultimate division among them.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In 1990, Lena Ortiz was injured when a light fixture fell in a diner in Memphis, Tennessee. She timely sued only the diner for negligent maintenance; before trial, the diner sought to reduce its liability by identifying a maintenance contractor and a fixture distributor whose alleged negligence also contributed to the injury, but Lena's direct claims against those entities had long since expired.

Under the majority's transitional-case approach, which result is most consistent with Tennessee law?

Explanation. In a transitional case pending when comparative fault was adopted, the majority applied comparative fault only to the extent it could be done without substantial injustice, guided by fairness and efficiency. It would be unfair to let the original defendant reduce its liability by pointing to time-barred actors while leaving the plaintiff without the full recovery she expected when she timely sued under prior law. At the same time, the original defendant may pursue third-party claims so ultimate liability can be allocated consistently with comparative fault. (Derived from Owens v. Truckstops of America, Inc. (n.d.).)