People v. Jovanovic

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department · 1999 · Evidence
700 N.Y.S.2d 156 (App. Div. 1999)
Updated
EvidenceRape Shield LawConfrontationCross-examinationCPL 60.42rape shieldsexual conductstatements vs conduct

Facts

The charges arose from an in-person date after weeks of online communications between defendant and the complainant. Before meeting, the complainant sent defendant e-mails containing statements indicating interest in sadomasochism and discussing a sadomasochistic relationship with another person, but the trial court redacted key portions and barred related questioning under CPL 60.42. Defendant sought to use those statements not to show unchastity, but to show the complainant's state of mind on consent, his own understanding of her intentions, and a possible motive to fabricate. The court also limited inquiry into the complainant's statements about another woman's rape claim and admitted the full text of a newspaper article about an online relationship ending in killing.

Issue

Did the trial court misapply New York's Rape Shield Law by excluding the complainant's e-mail statements and related cross-examination, thereby improperly restricting defendant's ability to present a defense and confront the complainant? Also, were the court's other evidentiary rulings regarding inquiry into the rape-related e-mail and the newspaper article erroneous and prejudicial?

Rule

Under CPL 60.42, evidence of a victim's sexual conduct is generally inadmissible, but the statute does not by its terms bar mere statements about sexual matters when those statements are offered not for their truth but to show the speaker's or listener's state of mind. Even if such statements are treated as sexual-conduct evidence, they may be admissible under the statute's exceptions, including prior conduct with the accused, rebuttal of the People's showing that the accused caused the victim's physical condition, and the interests-of-justice exception. Exclusion of highly relevant evidence cannot be sustained where it improperly impairs the defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a sexual abuse prosecution in Manhattan, Noah Mercer claims the encounter was consensual. Before meeting, the complainant, Elena Ruiz, sent Noah messages saying she liked being "pinned down" and "bossed around," and Noah offers the messages only to show what Elena communicated to him and his resulting understanding, not to prove she had actually done those things before.

Should the trial court exclude the messages under New York's rape shield statute solely because they contain sexual subject matter?

Explanation. The majority drew a distinction between evidence of a complainant's sexual conduct and evidence of statements concerning sexual matters. When the statements are offered not for their truth, but to show the complainant's state of mind or the defendant's understanding of her intentions, the rape shield statute does not by its terms automatically bar them. The key is the purpose for which the evidence is offered, not merely that the content is sexual.