People v. Luparello

California Court of Appeal · 1986 · Criminal Law

187 Cal. App. 3d 410 (1986)

Updated August 1, 2026

Criminal Lawaccomplicenatural and probable consequencesconspiracyaiding and abettingreasonably foreseeable offenseconspiracy liabilityderivative liability

Facts

After Terri left Luparello and reconciled with her husband, Luparello began an intensive effort to find her and enlisted Orduna and Salmon to help, discussing payment for their services. At Luparello's house, Salmon said they were going to "thump" the person from whom they wanted information, Orduna agreed, and Luparello said he wanted the information "at any cost"; Orduna carried a sword, Salmon had nunchakus, and Salmon loaded Luparello's .22 rifle. The group made one failed attempt to get Mark Martin out of his house so Orduna and Salmon could beat him, then returned the next day armed again; after Luparello said he had some Mexicans who were going to take care of Martin, Orduna lured Martin outside and someone in or near a parked car shot Martin to death. The jury convicted both defendants of conspiracy and murder, and found a lying-in-wait special circumstance true as to Orduna only.

Issue

Can a defendant who conspired to assault and aided a planned violent confrontation be held liable for murder committed by confederates when the killing was not shown to be part of the original plan? Also, does the Ireland merger principle prevent use of conspiracy or aiding-and-abetting natural-and-probable-consequences instructions to impose murder liability in that setting?

Rule

A conspirator is criminally liable for a coconspirator's act that follows as a probable and natural consequence of the common design, even if it was not intended as part of the original design or plan, so long as it is not a fresh and independent product outside the common design. Likewise, an aider and abettor is liable not only for the particular crime he knows his confederates are contemplating, but also for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences of any act he knowingly aids or encourages. These derivative liability principles are distinct from felony murder and are not barred by the Ireland merger doctrine.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Sacramento, Devin Cross paid Omar Vega and Luis Mena to force a mechanic, Nolan Price, to reveal where Devin’s former partner was staying. Devin told them to get the information "whatever it takes" and knew Omar brought a metal pipe and Luis carried a handgun. During the confrontation, Luis shot Nolan when Nolan tried to retreat into his garage.

If Devin is tried for murder on a conspiracy theory, which is the strongest argument for liability?

Explanation. The majority held that a conspirator is liable for a coconspirator’s act that follows as a probable and natural consequence of the common design, even if not intended as part of the original plan, so long as it is not a fresh and independent product outside the design. An armed effort to beat or threaten someone into providing information can foreseeably escalate to homicide.