HomeCase briefs › Criminal Procedure

Porter v. McCollum

Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 · Criminal Procedure
Criminal ProcedureIneffective Assistance of CounselCapital SentencingHabeas CorpusSixth AmendmentStricklandmitigationpenalty phase

Facts

At the penalty phase of Porter's capital trial, standby counsel was appointed about a month before sentencing and presented almost no mitigating evidence beyond limited testimony from Porter's ex-wife and a deposition excerpt. In later postconviction proceedings, Porter introduced substantial evidence that counsel had not uncovered, including severe childhood abuse, distinguished and traumatic combat service in Korea, long-term substance abuse, brain damage, cognitive defects, and mental-health impairment. Counsel had not obtained Porter's school, medical, or military records, interviewed family members, or meaningfully investigated mental health mitigation. The Florida courts concluded Porter was not prejudiced by any deficiency, despite the Florida Supreme Court's earlier removal on direct appeal of one aggravating factor for the murder sentence that resulted in death.

Issue

Whether the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that Porter was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence at the capital penalty phase. Also, because the state court did not decide deficiency, whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient.

Rule

Under Strickland, counsel is ineffective if representation falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. In evaluating prejudice at capital sentencing, a court must consider the totality of available mitigating evidence, including evidence presented later in postconviction proceedings, and reweigh it against the aggravating evidence; under AEDPA, relief is warranted when the state court's rejection of the claim is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, or rests on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

  • The court's holding and reasoning
  • Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
  • 10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case
Sign up free to see more →
Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In a capital sentencing in Phoenix, standby counsel took over five weeks before the penalty phase after Nolan Reyes stopped representing himself. Counsel met Nolan once for about 20 minutes, obtained no school, medical, or military records, and did not contact any relatives, even though competency materials noted head injuries, special-education placement, and combat service.

If Nolan later seeks habeas relief, which is the strongest argument that counsel performed deficiently?

Explanation. The governing rule is that penalty-phase counsel has an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background, and at minimum must undertake some mitigation investigation. Where counsel neither interviews witnesses nor seeks records despite clear leads in existing materials, the failure is deficient because it does not reflect reasonable professional judgment. The majority rejected the idea that prior self-representation or a limited appointment excuses counsel from even a cursory investigation.