Riste v. Eastern Washington Bible Camp, Inc.

Washington Court of Appeals · Property

Propertyfee simplerestraint on alienationgrantor approval clausereligious restrictionscreed discriminationRCW 49.60.224equitable estoppel

Facts

Eastern Washington Bible Camp owned land on Silver Lake and subdivided part of it into lots sold only to people who agreed to subscribe to the tenets of the Assembly of God Church. In 1968, Riste's parents contracted to buy two lots, and in 1974, after the contract was paid in full, the Camp issued the deed to Riste at the request of his surviving parent. Both the contract and deed contained restrictions, including a clause barring resale without the seller's written approval and a clause forbidding occupants from conduct in conflict with Assemblies of God practices and principles and prohibiting Sunday building work. Riste later attempted to sell contrary to the restrictions, the Camp refused to remove them, and he brought this action.

Issue

Whether deed restrictions requiring the seller's written approval before resale and limiting occupancy and conduct according to Assemblies of God principles were valid and enforceable against a fee simple grantee. Also, whether alleged factual disputes about Riste's knowledge of the restrictions precluded summary judgment or supported equitable estoppel.

Rule

In Washington, when a grantor conveys a fee simple estate, a deed clause prohibiting the grantee from conveying the land without the grantor's approval is void as repugnant to the nature of a fee simple estate, subject only to limited exceptions for reasonable restraints justified by legitimate interests. A deed restriction that directly or indirectly restricts conveyance or occupancy of real property on the basis of creed is void under RCW 49.60.224, and equitable estoppel does not apply to validate such a disabling restraint that is invalid on public policy grounds. For summary judgment, only facts that could affect the outcome are material.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Boise, Idaho, Cedar Bluff Retreat conveyed a lakeside parcel to Maya Chen by warranty deed stating that Maya held the property in fee simple. The deed also provided that Maya could not transfer the parcel to anyone without Cedar Bluff's prior written consent.

If Maya challenges the consent-to-transfer clause, which is the best result under the majority rule applied in this case?

Explanation. When a grantor conveys a fee simple estate, a deed clause preventing the grantee from conveying without the grantor's approval is void as repugnant to the nature of the fee. The majority treated that kind of seller-approval provision as a direct disabling restraint on alienation and invalid absent a narrow legitimate-interest exception not present here. (Derived from Riste v. Eastern Washington Bible Camp, Inc. (n.d.).)