Shelley v. Kraemer
Facts
In Missouri, property owners had recorded an agreement providing that property in a designated district could not be occupied by persons not of the Caucasian race, and respondents sued after the Shelleys, who were Negroes, purchased property covered by the covenant. The Missouri Supreme Court ordered enforcement of the covenant, including divestment of title. In Michigan, a similar recorded agreement provided that the property should not be used or occupied except by persons of the Caucasian race, and after Black petitioners acquired and occupied the property, respondents obtained a decree requiring them to move and forbidding future occupancy. In both cases, willing sellers had conveyed property to willing Black purchasers, and the exclusion was accomplished through state-court enforcement.
Issue
Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit state courts from judicially enforcing private racially restrictive covenants that exclude persons from owning or occupying property on the basis of race or color? More specifically, does such judicial enforcement constitute state action?
Rule
The Fourteenth Amendment reaches only state action, not merely private conduct. Private racially restrictive covenants, standing alone and voluntarily observed, do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but when state courts grant judicial enforcement of such covenants, that enforcement is state action, and if it denies persons property rights on account of race or color, it violates the Equal Protection Clause.
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