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Schneider v. State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington

Supreme Court of the United States · 1939 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFreedom of SpeechFreedom of the PressMunicipal RegulationFirst AmendmentFourteenth Amendmentincorporationhandbills

Facts

Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Worcester enforced ordinances that absolutely prohibited distribution of handbills on public streets and related public places; the defendants had handed literature to willing pedestrians, and some lower courts justified the bans as anti-litter measures because recipients sometimes discarded the papers. In Irvington, a Jehovah's Witness went door to door offering religious booklets and requesting small contributions without obtaining the ordinance's required police permit. That permit system required detailed personal information, photographing, fingerprinting, and allowed the police chief to deny a permit based on the applicant's character or the supposed absence of fraud in the project. The challenged regulations therefore either flatly barred street distribution or conditioned house-to-house dissemination of ideas on prior police approval.

Issue

May a municipality, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prohibit the distribution of literature on public streets in order to prevent littering, or require a prior police permit for door-to-door distribution of literature and advocacy? More specifically, do such ordinances unconstitutionally abridge freedom of speech and of the press?

Rule

Although municipalities may regulate the use of streets and protect public safety, health, welfare, and convenience, they may not do so in a way that abridges the constitutional liberty to speak, print, and distribute information or opinion. Preventing littering or promoting convenience is insufficient to justify banning hand-to-hand distribution of literature to willing recipients on public streets, and a municipality may not require those who wish to disseminate ideas door to door to submit to prior licensing or police discretion over who may speak or what may be distributed. A city may punish those who actually litter, punish fraud, forbid trespass, and impose reasonable noncensorial regulations, including reasonable hours in some contexts, but it may not impose censorship through licensing on the dissemination of ideas.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The city council of Toledo, Ohio, adopts an ordinance making it unlawful to hand any leaflet, pamphlet, or card to pedestrians on public sidewalks. The city explains that recipients often drop the papers, creating clutter and cleanup costs. Nora Kim is fined after offering environmental pamphlets to passersby who willingly accept them.

Nora challenges the ordinance under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. How should a court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion, and that a city may not absolutely prohibit a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it merely to prevent litter. The proper target is the person who actually litters, not the speaker. Alternative channels do not save the ban.