Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
Facts
Shelton was convicted in Florida of delivery of cocaine and sentenced as a habitual felony offender to eighteen years' imprisonment. Because his conviction came after the 2002 enactment of Fla. Stat. § 893.101, the jury was instructed that the State needed to prove only that he delivered a substance and that the substance was cocaine; the jury was not required to find any knowledge or intent. Florida's statutory scheme expressly provided that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of any Chapter 893 offense and made lack of such knowledge an affirmative defense. Shelton argued in federal habeas that this statutory elimination of mens rea rendered § 893.13 facially unconstitutional.
Issue
Whether Fla. Stat. § 893.13, as amended by Fla. Stat. § 893.101 to eliminate mens rea as an element of the drug offense of delivery of cocaine and to make lack of knowledge an affirmative defense, facially violates the Due Process Clause. Also, whether Shelton was entitled to § 2254 relief on that basis.
Rule
Due process permits strict-liability crimes only within narrow limits. Under the framework applied from Supreme Court precedent, a strict-liability offense is constitutionally suspect and invalid when it imposes severe penalties, results in substantial stigma, and regulates conduct that is not inherently dangerous or not inherently likely to be regulated; a state may not avoid these limits by redefining mens rea as an affirmative defense and shifting the burden to the defendant.
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Under the district court's due process analysis, which is the strongest argument that the statute is facially unconstitutional?