Skidmore v. Swift & Co.

Supreme Court of the United States · 1944 · Administrative Law

Administrative LawFair Labor Standards ActJudicial deference to agency interpretationsWaiting time as working timeSkidmoreagency interpretationspersuasive deferencewaiting time

Facts

The employees worked daytime shifts at Swift's packing plant and were paid weekly salaries for those duties. Under an oral agreement, they also had to remain in the company fire hall or within hailing distance three and a half to four nights a week, subject to answering alarms, but they were not required to perform specific tasks unless an alarm sounded. Alarms were rare, no fires occurred during the relevant period, and answering alarms rarely took more than an hour; the company provided sleeping and recreational facilities, and the employees received additional pay for each alarm answered. The trial court treated the fire-hall waiting time as not constituting hours worked.

Issue

Whether the employees' nighttime on-call fire-hall time could count as working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and what weight courts should give the Administrator's interpretive rulings on that question. More specifically, the Court considered whether waiting time is categorically excluded from work and how a court should assess the Administrator's views.

Rule

Waiting time is not categorically excluded from working time under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Whether waiting time falls within the Act is a question of fact determined by examining the parties' agreement, their practical construction of that agreement by conduct, the nature of the service, its relation to the waiting time, and all surrounding circumstances. The Administrator's rulings, interpretations, and opinions are not controlling on courts, but they are entitled to respect as a body of experience and informed judgment, with weight depending on their power to persuade.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Tulsa, Nolan Pierce works weekday shifts repairing conveyor belts for Red Mesa Milling. Three nights each week, he must remain in a bunkroom at the plant or within shouting distance of it, ready to respond if a grain jam occurs; jams are infrequent, and the company provides a bed, television, and kitchen access.

In Nolan's overtime suit, Red Mesa argues that the overnight periods cannot count as work because Nolan usually sleeps or relaxes. Which is the best response?

Explanation. The governing rule is that waiting time is not categorically excluded from working time. The issue is a fact-specific one for the trial court, which must examine the parties' agreement, their practical construction of it by conduct, the nature of the service, its relation to the waiting time, and all surrounding circumstances. A court errs if it assumes that sleep or leisure necessarily prevents the time from being work. (Derived from Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944).)