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Staub v. City of Baxley

Supreme Court of the United States · 1958 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFirst AmendmentPrior RestraintMunicipal Licensingfreedom of speechprior restraintlicensinguncontrolled discretion

Facts

Rose Staub was a salaried employee of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, which was attempting to organize employees of a manufacturing company near Baxley, Georgia. Without applying for a permit under a Baxley ordinance, she went to employees' homes in Baxley, spoke with them about joining the union, explained dues, and offered blank membership cards so workers could sign enough cards to petition for a labor-board election. No money was requested or received. She was charged and convicted solely for soliciting members for an organization without first obtaining the city permit required by the ordinance.

Issue

Whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction despite the Georgia Court of Appeals' reliance on state procedural grounds, and if so, whether Baxley's ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it conditioned solicitation speech on a permit that city officials could grant or withhold in their uncontrolled discretion.

Rule

A state procedural ground is not adequate to bar Supreme Court review when it lacks fair or substantial support in the circumstances. An ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments when it requires a permit for peaceful speech-related activity and authorizes officials to grant or refuse that permit in uncontrolled discretion, thereby imposing a prior restraint on protected expression.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Macon, Georgia, a city ordinance makes it unlawful to go door-to-door urging residents to join any dues-paying civic association unless the speaker first obtains a permit from the city council. The ordinance says the council may approve or deny the permit after considering the applicant's reputation, the organization's aims, and the proposal's effect on the community's welfare. Elena Ruiz peacefully speaks with residents in their homes about joining a neighborhood tenants' league and is convicted for soliciting without a permit.

If Elena challenges the ordinance under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, what is the strongest argument for reversal of her conviction?

Explanation. The controlling rule is that a permit scheme is an unconstitutional prior restraint when peaceful protected speech may occur only if officials choose to allow it under indefinite criteria and without controlling standards. Here, the council may deny a permit based on reputation, organizational aims, and community welfare, leaving the decision to uncontrolled discretion. That is the defect identified by the majority opinion.