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Collin v. Smith

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1978 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawFirst AmendmentFree SpeechPrior RestraintOverbreadthcontent discriminationsymbolic speechmarches and parades

Facts

NSPA, described by its leader as a Nazi party, planned a 30-minute, single-file sidewalk march in front of Skokie Village Hall by 30 to 50 demonstrators wearing uniforms with swastikas, carrying a swastika banner and placards such as "White Free Speech," with no speeches or literature distribution. Skokie had a large Jewish population, including several thousand Holocaust survivors. After the Village enacted ordinances requiring parade permits, banning dissemination of materials promoting hatred, and banning political demonstrations in military-style uniforms, NSPA applied for a permit to march on July 4, 1977. The permit was denied because the application disclosed an intent to violate the uniform ordinance, and the Village also treated anticipated violations of the hate-material and uniform ordinances as an "unlawful purpose" justifying denial under the permit ordinance.

Issue

Whether Skokie could constitutionally deny a permit for and criminalize NSPA's planned demonstration through ordinances prohibiting dissemination of materials promoting racial or religious hatred, forbidding permits for assemblies that would incite hatred or have an unlawful purpose, banning political demonstrations in military-style uniforms, and requiring insurance that these plaintiffs could not obtain. More specifically, the question was whether the First Amendment protected this proposed march and symbolic display despite its offensive and disturbing content.

Rule

Marching, picketing, displaying symbols, carrying placards, and wearing expressive insignia are within the ambit of the First Amendment. Because the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, ideas, subject matter, or content, content-based prohibitions and permit denials are unconstitutional unless they fall within narrow exceptions such as obscenity, fighting words, constitutionally limited libel, or speech posing an imminent danger of a grave substantive evil; protection of listeners from offense is permissible only where the speaker intrudes into the home or a truly captive audience cannot practically avoid exposure. A permit scheme that gives officials power to deny use of a forum in advance of expression is a prior restraint and carries a heavy presumption of invalidity.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Columbus, Ohio, the city council adopts an ordinance barring any parade permit for events whose signs or symbols would "promote hostility" toward any racial or religious group. Priya Desai seeks a permit for a peaceful Saturday march of 40 people on a public sidewalk, carrying offensive anti-immigrant placards, with no speeches and no expected traffic disruption.

If Priya challenges the ordinance, which is the strongest First Amendment analysis?

Explanation. The majority treated marching, placards, symbols, and expressive clothing as protected expression. A rule keyed to whether speech promotes hatred or hostility is content-based, not a neutral time, place, and manner regulation. Under the majority's reasoning, such content control is presumptively invalid unless it fits a narrow exception like obscenity, fighting words, constitutionally limited libel, or imminent danger of a grave substantive evil.