Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.

Supreme Court of the United States · 1969 · Federal Courts

Federal CourtsCivil RightsPropertySection 198242 U.S.C. § 198242 U.S.C. § 1988private discriminationlease

Facts

Little Hunting Park, Inc. operated community recreational facilities for residents of a defined area, and a membership share allowed the shareholder's immediate family to use those facilities. Under the bylaws, when a shareholder rented his home he could assign the share to the tenant subject to board approval. Sullivan leased his house to Freeman, a Black federal employee, and assigned the membership share to him, but the board refused to approve the assignment because Freeman was Negro. Sullivan protested, was given a hearing, and was expelled from the corporation, after which Sullivan and Freeman sued for injunctions and damages.

Issue

Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1982 reaches a private corporation's racially motivated refusal to approve assignment of a membership share incident to a lease of housing and whether a white owner expelled for advocating the Black tenant's rights may sue. The Court also considered whether the Virginia procedural ground barred Supreme Court review.

Rule

Section 1982 applies to private as well as state action and protects the right to lease real and personal property against racial interference by third parties as well as by the immediate lessor. A person punished for advocating the § 1982 rights of a minority claimant has standing to sue, and courts may fashion equitable relief and appropriate damages to vindicate the federal right. A state procedural rule that is discretionary rather than jurisdictional does not preclude Supreme Court certiorari review.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a housing-discrimination suit filed in North Carolina state court, the trial judge entered judgment for Cedar Glen Recreation Association. On appeal, Maya Ortiz's lawyer gave opposing counsel oral notice and same-day written notice that the transcript had been submitted to the judge, and the judge delayed signing it for four days while opposing counsel reviewed it and then consented to corrections. The North Carolina Supreme Court refused review, calling the notice rule 'jurisdictional,' but prior state cases had applied the rule inconsistently and treated similar defects flexibly.

If Maya petitions the U.S. Supreme Court to review the federal civil-rights issue, is certiorari most likely barred by an adequate and independent state ground?

Explanation. The majority treated a similar state notice requirement as not barring review where state decisions did not show such consistent application as to amount to a self-denial of power to hear the federal claim. Even though the state court labeled the rule jurisdictional, the Court looked to how the rule functioned in practice and concluded it was more discretionary than jurisdictional. Therefore certiorari would not be barred here. (Derived from Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. (1969).)