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Taylor v. Sturgell

Supreme Court of the United States · 2008 · Civil Procedure

Civil Procedurepreclusionvirtual representationres judicatanon-party preclusionclaim preclusionissue preclusionres judicata

Facts

Herrick sought FAA records concerning the Fairchild F-45 aircraft and lost his FOIA suit after the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the FAA. Less than a month later, Taylor, a friend and close associate of Herrick and president of an organization to which Herrick belonged, filed his own FOIA request and then sued for the same records. Taylor and Herrick had no legal relationship, and the record showed no evidence that Taylor controlled, financed, participated in, or even had notice of Herrick's earlier suit. The lower courts nonetheless held Taylor bound by the prior judgment because Herrick was said to be Taylor's virtual representative.

Issue

May a federal court preclude a nonparty from litigating based on a broad doctrine of 'virtual representation' when the nonparty was not a party to the earlier suit and the case does not fit within the established exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion? If not, can Taylor's suit still be barred on the narrower ground that he is acting as Herrick's agent or proxy?

Rule

A person is generally not bound by a judgment in personam in litigation to which he was not a party. In federal-question cases, nonparty preclusion is limited to established categories: agreement to be bound, certain pre-existing substantive legal relationships, adequate representation in limited representative suits, assumption of control over the prior litigation, relitigation through a representative or agent, and special statutory schemes consistent with due process. Adequate representation requires, at minimum, aligned interests and either that the representative understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or that the original court took care to protect the nonparty's interests; notice may also sometimes be required. A mere whiff of tactical maneuvering is insufficient to establish agency-based preclusion; principles of agency suggest the later suit must be subject to the control of the party bound by the first judgment.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Denver, Nina Lopez sued a federal archives agency under a federal statute seeking release of a set of inspection reports and lost on the merits. Two weeks later, Omar Reed, a member of the same preservation club, filed his own suit for the same reports in federal court in Colorado. Omar had not known about Nina’s suit, but the agency argues he is barred because he and Nina had identical interests, used the same lawyer, and were close friends.

How should the court rule on the preclusion defense?

Explanation. A nonparty generally is not bound by a judgment in personam. The Court rejected any broad federal doctrine of preclusion by virtual representation. Similar interests, friendship, and shared counsel are not enough unless the case falls within an established exception, such as adequate representation with required safeguards, control, agency, agreement, a substantive legal relationship, or a special statutory scheme. On these facts, none is shown.