Tedla v. Ellman

New York Court of Appeals · 1939 · Torts

Tortsnegligence per sestatutory violationexcusereasonable deviationcontributory negligencenegligence per sestatutory excuse

Facts

Anna Tedla and her brother were walking along Sunrise Highway at night, pushing baby carriages containing junk, when they were struck by a car operated by the defendant Heilman; Tedla was injured and her brother was killed. The highway had two separated roadways, no footpaths, and a soft center grass plot, so pedestrians using the roadway were not acting unlawfully. A statute required pedestrians walking on the roadway to keep to the left of the center line, but they were proceeding east on the eastbound, right-hand roadway. There was testimony that eastbound traffic was very light while westbound traffic was very heavy, and the jury found the accident was due solely to the driver's negligence.

Issue

Does a pedestrian's violation of a statute requiring pedestrians to walk on the left side of the roadway constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, even where compliance would have exposed the pedestrian to greater danger? Also, was the pedestrians' position on the roadway a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law?

Rule

When a statute prescribes a fixed standard of care or specific safeguards against a recognized danger, unexcused violation is negligence as a matter of law. But when a statute states a general rule of conduct, such as a rule of the road, intended for ordinary conditions and compliance under unusual circumstances would defeat the statute's safety purpose by increasing danger, the statute is construed as subject to exceptions; deviation without good cause is wrongful, but justified deviation is not negligence as a matter of law, and proximate cause ordinarily remains a fact question.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

At dusk outside Albany, Nora Kim walked along the shoulderless edge of a divided highway to reach a bus stop. A state statute directed pedestrians on a roadway to walk facing traffic on the left side, but Nora instead stayed on the right-side roadway because traffic on the left-side roadway was backed up bumper-to-bumper after a stadium event while the right-side roadway was nearly empty. A driver on the right-side roadway drifted onto the edge and struck her from behind.

In Nora's suit against the driver, the driver argues that Nora was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because she violated the pedestrian statute. How should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority distinguished statutes prescribing definite safeguards from statutes stating general rules of conduct such as rules of the road. A pedestrian statute requiring travel on one side of the roadway is a general rule meant for usual conditions. If unusual circumstances make literal compliance more dangerous and the pedestrian has good cause to deviate, the violation is not negligence as a matter of law. Here, the crowded left-side roadway and nearly empty right-side roadway permit a factfinder to conclude Nora acted prudently, so the issue is not resolved against her as a matter of law.