Britton v. Wooten

Supreme Court of Kentucky · 1991 · Torts

Tortsnegligenceproximate causesuperseding causeleasesexculpatory clausesnegligence per selease interpretation

Facts

Part of Wooten's grocery store operated in a building owned by Britton and leased to Wooten. Britton alleged the lessee negligently allowed combustible trash and refuse to accumulate next to the building up to the eaves, in violation of Kentucky fire safety regulations, so that a fire starting in the trash spread up the wall to the combustible roof and destroyed the building. The only record evidence specifically identifying the fire's origin was an arson investigator's opinion that someone set fire to paper boxes in or near the dumpsters, and there was testimony that the dumpsters had been overflowing with trash for days. The lease stated that the lessee shall take good care of the premises and that if the premises were destroyed by fire or act of God, the lessee could surrender the lease without further obligation and the lease would be cancelled.

Issue

Did the lease provision allowing the lessee to surrender the lease without further obligation if the premises were destroyed by fire bar the lessor's negligence claim for destruction of the building? If not, did the possible intentional setting of the fire by a third party constitute a superseding cause as a matter of law defeating liability for the lessee's negligent accumulation of combustible trash?

Rule

An agreement will relieve a party from tort liability for negligence only if it clearly and unequivocally expresses that intent; language ending further obligations under a lease after fire ordinarily releases only contractual duties, not the duty of care. Violations of safety administrative regulations are negligence per se and support liability if they are a substantial factor in causing the loss. A third person's intentional or criminal act does not automatically break causation; it is a superseding cause only when it is so independent and highly extraordinary that the defendant's antecedent negligence cannot be treated as a substantial factor in the harm.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Lexington, Maya Holloway leased a storefront to Trent Voss for a bakery. The lease stated: "Tenant shall keep the premises in good condition, ordinary wear excepted. If the premises are destroyed by fire, Tenant may terminate this lease without further obligation." After Trent's employees repeatedly left stacks of cardboard beside an exterior wall, a fire destroyed the building.

If Maya sues Trent for negligent destruction of the building, what is the strongest argument against Trent's claim that the lease bars the suit?

Explanation. The governing rule is that a party is relieved from tort liability for negligence only if the agreement clearly and unequivocally expresses that intent. A clause allowing termination "without further obligation" after fire ordinarily addresses contractual obligations under the lease, not tort liability. Because this lease does not explicitly exculpate negligence, Maya's tort claim is not barred.