Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab Co.

Connecticut Supreme Court · 2019 · Torts

TortsNegligenceProximate CauseSuperseding Causecriminally reckless conductintervening criminal actapportionment unavailablesubstantial factor

Facts

Sainval, a taxicab driver, left his unlocked cab unattended with the keys in the ignition in a Norwalk area known for significant criminal activity. Two teenagers stole the cab, drove it while intoxicated, and after rear-ending another vehicle in Stamford, Bowden drove onto a sidewalk while trying to flee and struck the plaintiff, causing severe injuries. The plaintiff alleged that leaving the cab that way created a reasonably foreseeable risk that it would be stolen, driven unsafely, and cause injury. The defendants asserted that the teenagers' criminally reckless conduct was a superseding cause relieving them of liability.

Issue

Does the doctrine of superseding cause remain available when a third party's intervening conduct is criminally reckless rather than specifically intended to cause harm? If so, were the jury's interrogatory answers legally consistent when the jury found both that Sainval's negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries and that the accident was outside the scope of the risk created by his negligence?

Rule

The doctrine of superseding cause remains a viable defense in cases in which apportionment is unavailable, including cases involving a third party's criminally reckless conduct. A negligent defendant is not relieved of liability by a third party's reckless or intentional conduct if the type of harm sustained is within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligence; under Connecticut precedent, a finding of superseding cause means the intervening conduct is the sole proximate cause and precludes a finding that the defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Hartford, Leo Mendez left a delivery van unlocked and idling outside an apartment complex while he ran inside for several minutes. A teenager stole the van, sped away through city streets, and while driving drunk swerved onto a sidewalk and injured Nina Patel.

In Nina's negligence action against Leo, Leo argues that the teenager's criminally reckless driving was a superseding cause. Which is the strongest statement of the governing rule?

Explanation. The majority held that superseding cause remains available in cases involving a third party's criminally reckless conduct when apportionment is unavailable. But the doctrine does not relieve a negligent defendant if the type of harm suffered was within the scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligence. (Derived from Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab Co. (n.d.).)