Home › Case briefs › Constitutional Law

Thompson v. Trump

United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2022 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawJanuary 6TrumpCapitol riot§ 1985(1)civil conspiracyincitementpresidential immunity

Facts

Plaintiffs alleged that after the 2020 election President Trump and allies spread false claims of election fraud, promoted a January 6 rally, and that Trump and his campaign devised an unauthorized march from the Ellipse to the Capitol. At the rally, Trump repeated that the election had been stolen, urged supporters to "fight like hell," and then directed them to march to the Capitol while Congress was certifying the Electoral College vote. Supporters, including organized groups such as the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, breached the Capitol and disrupted the certification, injuring members of Congress and Capitol Police officers. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) and related theories, alleging a conspiracy to prevent Congress from discharging its duties and to prevent the President-elect and Vice President-elect from accepting office.

Issue

Whether the court had jurisdiction over plaintiffs' civil claims arising from January 6, and whether the complaints plausibly stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) and certain District of Columbia tort theories despite defenses based on presidential immunity and the First Amendment. More specifically, the court had to decide whether President Trump's alleged conduct was official and immune, whether his January 6 speech was protected political advocacy or plausible incitement, and whether the pleadings adequately alleged a conspiracy.

Rule

At the pleading stage, plaintiffs have Article III standing if they plausibly allege concrete injury, causation, and redressability; emotional harm can qualify as concrete injury for § 1985(1) and § 1986. A President has absolute immunity from damages only for acts within the outer perimeter of official responsibilities, not for unofficial acts aimed at securing personal incumbency, though immunity does bar liability for failure to exercise official presidential powers under § 1986. Political speech on matters of public concern remains protected unless, under Brandenburg, it is plausibly directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and likely to produce such action; under § 1985(1), plaintiffs must plausibly allege an express or tacit agreement to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat federal officials from discharging duties or covered officials from accepting or holding office.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

After losing reelection, President Alan Mercer spent December calling county canvassing boards in Arizona and Michigan, urging them to withdraw certified vote totals so state legislatures could keep him in office. He also posted campaign-funded messages telling supporters that Congress should reject the electoral count. Several federal officials later sued him for damages under a federal anti-conspiracy statute.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, is Mercer most likely entitled to absolute presidential immunity for these acts?

Explanation. Absolute immunity protects damages claims only for acts within the outer perimeter of official presidential responsibility. The majority rejected the idea that efforts to remain in office through election certification pressure are official acts; the presidency has no function of securing incumbency. The court also rejected reliance on the Take Care Clause where the Constitution and electoral-count procedures assign duties to Congress and the Vice President, not the sitting President. Motive proof is not the test; the key is the relationship between the challenged act and a corresponding presidential function. (Derived from Thompson v. Trump (n.d.).)