Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller

Supreme Court of Missouri · Contracts

ContractsSpecific performanceContracts to devise real estatespecific performancewritten contractcontract to devisereal estateadequate legal remedy

Facts

Flora Metta Morrison owned a 160-acre farm and had earlier executed a will directing that the farm be sold and the proceeds go to Davidson College, while giving plaintiff's husband an option to purchase at appraised value. On May 3, 1963, Morrison and plaintiff Ruby Tuckwiller signed a written agreement that plaintiff would care for Morrison for life by providing meals, a bed, nursing, and every possible pleasure, and in exchange Morrison would devise the farm to plaintiff while retaining farm income during life and paying her own medicine expense. Plaintiff resigned her job on May 6 to perform the agreement, and Morrison sought to change her will but was prevented by renewed illness and hospitalization. Morrison died about six weeks later, after plaintiff had assisted with her care, and defendants argued the services were too brief and readily compensable in money to justify specific performance of a farm worth $34,400.

Issue

When a decedent made a written contract to devise real estate in exchange for lifetime care, may equity order specific performance even though the promisor died shortly after the agreement and the promisee's actual services were brief and could be assigned a monetary value? More specifically, should fairness and adequacy be judged at the time of contracting or by hindsight after the promisor's early death?

Rule

For a written contract to convey or devise real estate, equity will deny specific performance only if the contract is inequitable, unconscionable, or supported by shockingly inadequate consideration. In determining unfairness, unconscionability, or sufficiency of consideration, the transaction must be viewed prospectively from the time of the agreement, not retrospectively in light of later events. Once a written contract concerning real property is found fair and adequately supported, the real-estate subject matter itself makes legal damages inadequate, and specific performance is the ordinary remedy.

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In Columbia, Missouri, Lena Harper, age 78, signed a written agreement promising to devise her 120-acre farm to Naomi Price if Naomi would leave her restaurant job and provide Lena with meals, lodging, nursing, and personal care for the rest of Lena's life. Naomi quit her job the next week, but Lena died unexpectedly from a ruptured aneurysm 18 days later after Naomi had provided only limited care.

If Lena's devisees argue that Naomi should receive only the market value of 18 days of services because the farm is worth far more, which result is most consistent with the governing rule?

Explanation. The majority rule is that a written contract to devise real estate is judged for fairness, unconscionability, and adequacy of consideration as of the time of contracting, not retrospectively after later events. A promisee who assumed an uncertain and potentially onerous lifetime-care obligation is not deprived of specific performance merely because the promisor died soon thereafter. Once the written real-estate contract is fair and adequately supported, money damages are treated as inadequate because the subject matter is land. (Derived from Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller (n.d.).)