United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy

Supreme Court of the United States · 1954 · Administrative Law

347 U.S. 260 (1954)

Updated July 19, 2026

Administrative LawAccardi doctrineagency regulationsindependent discretionBoard of Immigration AppealsAttorney Generalhabeas corpusadministrative due process

Facts

Petitioner entered the United States from Canada in 1932 without inspection and without an immigration visa, and deportation proceedings began in 1947. He applied in 1948 for suspension of deportation under § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917, but a hearing officer recommended denial, the Acting Commissioner adopted that recommendation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals later affirmed. In a second habeas petition, petitioner alleged that before the Board ruled, the Attorney General had circulated a confidential list of "unsavory characters" including petitioner and had publicly announced plans to deport them, making fair consideration by the Board impossible. The district court refused a hearing on those allegations and denied relief summarily.

Issue

Whether allegations that the Attorney General circulated a list identifying petitioner as one of the persons he planned to deport, before the Board ruled on petitioner's request for discretionary suspension of deportation, stated a claim that the Board failed to exercise the independent discretion required by governing regulations and therefore entitled petitioner to a hearing.

Rule

When valid regulations require an administrative board to exercise its own discretion in deciding appeals, those regulations have the force and effect of law, and the superior official who heads the department may not sidestep the board or dictate its decision while the regulations remain operative. If a petitioner plausibly alleges that such required discretion was not independently exercised because of the superior official's prejudgment or direction, he is entitled to an opportunity to prove that allegation.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Federal Housing Relief Bureau in Chicago has a regulation providing that its Appeals Panel "shall exercise the discretion vested in the Director" when deciding hardship waivers, and that panel decisions are final unless the Director formally calls up a case for review. Before Maya Ortiz's appeal is decided, the Director circulates a department-wide memo naming Maya and several others as people he "plans to remove from the waiver rolls immediately," and panel members receive the memo.

If Maya files suit alleging that the panel's later denial was tainted because it failed to exercise the independent discretion required by the regulation, what is the strongest conclusion?

Explanation. Where valid regulations require a subordinate board to exercise its own discretion, those regulations have the force and effect of law. A superior official may not sidestep that structure or dictate the board's decision while the regulations remain in force. Maya's claim targets failure to exercise independent discretion, not mere disagreement with the merits, so she states a proper claim and is entitled to try to prove it. (Derived from United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy (1954).)