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United States v. Cisna

United States Circuit Court for the District of Ohio · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawIndian Commerce ClauseFederal-State JurisdictionIndian tribescommerce with Indian tribesfederalismstate police powerintercourse act of 1802

Facts

The defendant was charged with stealing a horse within the twelve-mile-square Wyandott reserve in Crawford County, Ohio, from Henry Jocko, a friendly Indian. The indictment relied on section 4 of the 1802 federal intercourse act, which punished crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian territory against friendly Indians. By the time of this prosecution, the reserve was surrounded by dense white settlement, heavily frequented by whites, crossed by public roads, and the Wyandotts had become substantially integrated into local trade and daily intercourse; a federal sub-agent still resided among them and their treaties had not been abrogated. Ohio had also enacted a law making white inhabitants of the reservation subject to Ohio law for taxation and all civil, criminal, and military purposes.

Issue

Can a federal court exercise jurisdiction under the 1802 intercourse act to punish a white defendant for stealing property from a Wyandott Indian within the Wyandott reservation in Ohio? More specifically, had the federal power to enforce that statute within this reservation ceased because the tribe's situation made federal regulation of commerce with it wholly impracticable within the state?

Rule

Within a state, Congress can exercise no power over Indian territory beyond its constitutional power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. Federal criminal provisions protecting Indians under the intercourse laws are valid only as incidents of that commerce power; therefore, when a tribe's circumstances within a state have changed so that federal regulation of intercourse and trade can no longer practically operate, the incidental federal power to punish offenses under that law also ceases, and the state may punish its own citizens for offenses committed there so long as state action is not incompatible with constitutional federal regulations.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Michigan, Congress has enacted a statute making it a federal misdemeanor for non-Indians to commit theft against tribal members on reservation land inside the state. The statute is defended solely as part of Congress's regulation of trade and intercourse with Indian tribes, and the reservation remains remote, sparsely traveled by non-Indians, and subject to an operating federal licensing system for entry and trade.

If a non-Indian defendant argues that Congress lacks any constitutional authority to punish theft in these circumstances because criminal law is generally a state matter, how should the court rule under the lead opinion's reasoning?

Explanation. The lead opinion treats federal criminal protection of Indians within a state as constitutionally valid only when it is incidental to Congress's power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. It expressly rejects any general federal police power over offenses against Indians inside a state, but it also says the intercourse law was constitutional and once validly applied. So where the tribe's situation still allows practical operation of federal trade-and-intercourse regulation, the incidental federal criminal prohibition may stand. (Derived from United States v. Cisna (n.d.).)