United States v. Fonseca

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2006 · Evidence

435 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceSpeedy Trial ActCross-examinationImpeachment by contradiction18 U.S.C. § 3161(e)18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F)day-of-filing exclusionRule 403

Facts

Fonseca's first trial ended in a mistrial on August 26, 2003, and his retrial began on February 25, 2004. On November 4, 2003, the seventieth day after the mistrial, the government filed a pretrial motion that remained pending until the retrial began. At retrial, defense counsel cross-examined eyewitness Liz'a Williams about drug use and introduced evidence that she tested positive for cocaine in January 2003, but the district court barred questioning about a crack pipe allegedly found in her purse during a January arrest. Fonseca argued both that the retrial was untimely and that the restriction on questioning improperly limited impeachment of Williams.

Issue

Does the Speedy Trial Act exclusion for delay resulting from a pretrial motion begin on the same day the motion is filed, such that a motion filed on the seventieth day tolls the clock in time? Did the district court abuse its discretion under the evidence rules by preventing cross-examination of a government witness about a crack pipe found during an unrelated earlier arrest?

Rule

For purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), the excluded period for delay resulting from a pretrial motion begins on the day the motion is filed. Evidence offered to impeach by contradiction on a collateral matter may be excluded under Rule 403 when its probative value is substantially outweighed by risks such as confusion, undue delay, waste of time, misleading the jury, or needless cumulative proof.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

After a mistrial in a federal fraud prosecution in Baltimore, retrial had to begin within seventy days. On the seventieth day after the mistrial became final, the prosecutor filed a suppression motion at 9:00 a.m., and the court did not resolve it until three weeks later.

If the defendant moves to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The governing rule is that under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), the excluded period runs from the filing of the pretrial motion, beginning on the filing day itself. Because the motion was filed on the seventieth day, it tolled the clock in time. The majority relied on the statutory phrase 'from the filing of the motion' and rejected the argument that exclusion starts the next day.