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United States v. Ford

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1994 · Evidence
17 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 1994)
Updated
Evidencedouble jeopardymistrialconsentprosecutorial intentOregon v. KennedyRule 403impeachment

Facts

During Ford's first trial, defense witness Ruby Sledge was arrested in the federal building by local authorities on an outstanding state warrant, apparently contrary to informal courthouse arrest procedures, and she became too distraught to testify. The district court told Ford it would grant a mistrial if he wanted one; Ford initially declined but, after consulting counsel, requested a mistrial, and the court declared one without objection from Ford. Before the second trial, Ford moved to dismiss on double jeopardy and prosecutorial misconduct grounds, but the motions were denied, and he was convicted on all counts. At trial, the district court allowed impeachment of government witness George McMullen with the fact of a felony conviction and a prior forgery conviction, but excluded the specific nature of his sex-offense conviction under Rule 403.

Issue

Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Ford's retrial after a mistrial that he requested or at least consented to, whether the witness's arrest required dismissal for prosecutorial misconduct, whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding the specific nature of a prosecution witness's felony conviction, and whether the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction was properly granted.

Rule

When a defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, the manifest necessity standard does not apply. In that circumstance, double jeopardy bars retrial only if the conduct causing the mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. A trial court also has broad discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude the specific nature of a witness's prior felony conviction if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
During a drug trial in St. Louis, a defense witness becomes unavailable after courthouse security mistakenly escorts him to a holding room and he leaves in panic. The judge tells Devin Clark that a mistrial is available if he wants one. After conferring with counsel, Devin says he wants the judge to declare a mistrial, and he raises no objection when the jury is discharged.

If Devin later moves to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, which standard governs whether retrial is barred?

Explanation. When the defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, the manifest-necessity standard does not apply. Under the majority opinion, retrial is barred only if the conduct that led to the mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.