United States v. Greene

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1993 · Evidence

995 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993)

Updated August 22, 2026

EvidenceJury selectionPlea discussionsVenueSentencingequal protectionfair cross-sectiondistinctive group

Facts

Federal law excludes from jury service persons with pending felony charges, and Greene argued that this exclusion invalidated both the grand jury and petit-jury venire in his case. At trial, Greene sought to introduce evidence that he had rejected a plea agreement and also moved to suppress statements he made to a DEA agent, claiming they were made during protected plea discussions. The district court also struck eleven conditionally admitted co-conspirator statements but denied a mistrial. On the manufacturing count, the government's venue proof consisted of a map with pinholes and testimony that Greene had identified seven marijuana fields, but no testimony showed which pinholes corresponded to those fields or that any were in the Southern District of Iowa.

Issue

Whether Greene's conviction should be reversed because federal jury-service exclusions for persons charged but not convicted of felonies violate equal protection or the fair-cross-section requirement; whether the district court erred in excluding evidence of his rejected plea agreement, admitting statements to the DEA agent, and denying a mistrial after striking co-conspirator statements; whether venue was sufficiently proved on the manufacturing count; and whether the organizer enhancement at sentencing was proper.

Rule

Excluding persons with pending felony charges from federal jury service is constitutionally valid because it is rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest in assembling jurors likely to be unbiased and of unquestionable integrity, and any fair-cross-section infringement is adequately justified by the significant governmental interest in jurors who can conscientiously perform their duties. Evidence that a defendant rejected a plea agreement is excludable under circuit precedent and, when offered by the defendant as a prior consistent assertion of innocence, is hearsay outside Rule 801(d)(1)(B) if the defendant does not testify. Statements to law-enforcement agents are protected as plea-discussion statements only when the agent has actual authority, or at least represents authority, to negotiate for the prosecutor. Improperly admitted co-conspirator statements warrant a mistrial only when a cautionary instruction cannot cure the prejudice. Venue must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and cannot be established by speculation.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

During a meth investigation in Tulsa, DEA agent Nora Velez told Darren Cole that if he cooperated, she would inform the prosecutor and the judge that he had helped. She also said she could not promise any charge reduction and never claimed she could make a deal. Darren then admitted owning the drugs.

If Darren moves to exclude the admission as a protected plea-discussion statement, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority held that Rule 410 and Rule 11 protection extends to statements made to law-enforcement agents only when the agent has actual authority from the prosecutor, or at least represents that he has such authority. An agent who merely says cooperation will be reported to the prosecutor or court, while disclaiming power to promise anything, is not negotiating a plea bargain within the rule.