Waschak v. Moffat

Superior Court of Pennsylvania · Torts

TortsPrivate nuisanceprivate nuisancereasonablenesslawful businessmining operationshydrogen sulphideproperty damage

Facts

Plaintiffs bought and occupied a house in Taylor Borough and repainted it with white lead paint in October 1948; within six months the paint turned permanently black. Evidence showed that hydrogen sulphide in the atmosphere near the house, conceded to have come from defendants' culm dumps, chemically reacted with the lead paint and caused the discoloration. Defendants operated coal mining and processing facilities in the borough and maintained several large culm banks and a silt dam, with evidence that hydrogen sulphide was emitted beginning in 1948 from the Washington Street bank and the silt dam. Plaintiffs also sought damages for discomfort from the foul-smelling gas, though no health damages were claimed or submitted to the jury.

Issue

Whether defendants, whose coal mining operations were lawful and not shown to be negligent, reckless, ultrahazardous, or intentionally invasive, could nonetheless be held liable in private nuisance for hydrogen sulphide emissions from their culm banks and silt dam. More specifically, the question was whether the issue of nuisance liability was properly submitted to the jury on a reasonableness theory.

Rule

When a business lawful in itself is alleged to be a private nuisance, the controlling inquiry is whether the use of property or conduct of the business was reasonable in the particular locality, manner, and circumstances. No hard and fast rule governs; reasonableness depends on factors such as the nature of the neighborhood, proximity to dwellings and other structures, the importance and custom of the industry, and the nature and extent of the injury, while liability is not absolute merely because harmful consequences result.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Scranton, Keystone Valley Aggregates runs a lawful stone-crushing yard in a long-industrial corridor. Fine sulfurous emissions from its waste mound repeatedly tarnish copper gutters and create a persistent rotten-egg odor at Nina Ortiz's nearby rowhouse, but there is no evidence the company acted negligently or engaged in ultrahazardous activity.

If Nina sues for private nuisance, which is the strongest statement of the governing rule?

Explanation. The majority treated nuisance here as distinct from negligence and rejected both an intent requirement and absolute liability. Where the business is lawful in itself, the controlling inquiry is whether the use of land and conduct of operations were reasonable in the particular locality, manner, and circumstances, considering the character of the neighborhood and the extent of the harm. (Derived from Waschak v. Moffat (n.d.).)