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Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Young

District of Columbia Court of Appeals · 1999 · Torts
TortsNegligenceContributory NegligenceLast Clear ChanceEvidencebicycle-bus collisioncontributory negligencelast clear chance

Facts

Young was riding westbound on Calvert Street in the right lane toward an intersection where a Metro bus was ahead and to his left. According to evidence the jury could credit, as both entered the intersection the bus was slightly ahead, then made a sudden sharp right turn across Young's path into 29th Street, and Young struck the bus, fell under it, and was seriously injured. Evidence included testimony that Young was four to five feet from the right rear of the bus as they entered the intersection, that the driver either saw or should have seen him through the mirrors, and that the bus could have stopped before turning. WMATA's operating procedures instructed drivers to use mirrors to ensure the right side of the bus would clear the curb and vehicles or pedestrians and to stop and check if unsure of clearance.

Issue

Whether the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident despite Young's contributory negligence. The court also considered whether the trial court erred in reinstructing the jury on concurrent negligence and in admitting WMATA's operating procedures as evidence of the standard of care.

Rule

In the District of Columbia, contributory negligence ordinarily bars recovery, but under the doctrine of last clear chance a contributorily negligent plaintiff may recover if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) he was in a position of danger caused by the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant; (2) he was oblivious to the danger or unable to extricate himself from it; (3) the defendant was aware, or by reasonable care should have been aware, of the plaintiff's danger and obliviousness or inability to extricate himself; and (4) the defendant, with means available, could have avoided injuring the plaintiff after becoming aware, or after he reasonably should have become aware, of the danger and the plaintiff's inability to extricate himself, but failed to do so. On review of denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court will reverse only if no reasonable person, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, could reach a verdict in that party's favor. A company's operating rules are not conclusive and do not establish negligence per se, but they are admissible as some indication of the care required under the circumstances.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In downtown Portland, Omar Vega was riding an electric scooter in the right lane while a delivery truck traveled just to his left. As they entered an intersection, the truck abruptly cut across Omar's lane to make a tight right turn into a side street. Omar braked and leaned right but still struck the truck's side; a nearby driver testified that once the turn began, there was nothing Omar could have done to avoid impact.

Assume Omar was contributorily negligent for riding up alongside the truck. Under the governing doctrine, which is the strongest basis for allowing the jury to find the second element of last clear chance?

Explanation. The second element may be proved in either of two ways: the plaintiff was oblivious to the danger or was unable to extricate himself from the position of peril. He need not prove both. The majority specifically held that testimony that the plaintiff braked and turned but could not avoid the collision, along with eyewitness testimony, was sufficient for a jury to infer inextricability without requiring expert testimony.