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Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.

California Court of Appeal · Torts
TortsMarket share liabilityAsbestosProducts liabilityNonsuitSindellmarket share liabilityfungible goods

Facts

Plaintiffs alleged personal injuries from asbestos exposure and sought to proceed on a market share theory against manufacturers or successors to manufacturers of brake products. They offered to prove that most of their exposure to asbestos from brake pads occurred during inspection or replacement of worn pads, when brake dust was released and the pads' brand markings had been worn away. Plaintiffs also offered to prove that the pads at issue all used chrysotile asbestos and contained roughly 40 to 60 percent asbestos by weight. Although some plaintiffs could identify at least one maker of new pads, they alleged the vast majority of their exposure came from used, unidentifiable pads and that they had joined a substantial share of the manufacturers of the relevant friction products.

Issue

Did plaintiffs' offer of proof state facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case for market share liability under Sindell against manufacturers of asbestos-containing brake products? More specifically, could brake-pad asbestos cases fit Sindell despite asbestos's general inapplicability in other contexts and despite some ability to identify certain manufacturers of new pads?

Rule

On a nonsuit after an opening statement or equivalent offer of proof, the court must assume plaintiffs can prove all favorable facts alleged, and nonsuit is proper only if no substantial evidence could support a verdict for plaintiffs. Under Sindell, market share liability is available only for a fungible product that cannot be traced to a specific producer and only if plaintiff joins a substantial share of the product's makers. For asbestos-containing brake pads, fungibility may be satisfied where the pads contain roughly comparable quantities of a single asbestos fiber, chrysotile, and inability to identify may be satisfied where the injury-causing exposure arises from worn pads whose use has destroyed identifying markings.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Sacramento, Maya Ortiz sued several makers of asbestos-containing clutch linings, alleging she inhaled dust while servicing worn linings at a trucking depot. In lieu of an opening statement, she offered to prove that the linings all used the same asbestos fiber, had similar asbestos content, their markings were rubbed off by ordinary use before the dust exposure occurred, and the defendants made a substantial share of the relevant market.

If the defendants move for nonsuit immediately after this offer of proof, how should the court rule?

Explanation. A nonsuit after an opening statement, or its equivalent, is proper only if there is no substantial evidence that could support a plaintiff's verdict. The majority treated an offer of proof as the equivalent of an opening statement and required the court to assume the plaintiff could prove all favorable facts alleged. Because Maya's offer covers the prima facie Sindell elements recognized by the majority, nonsuit should be denied. (Derived from Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (n.d.).)