Woodall v. Wayne Steffner Productions

California Court of Appeal · Torts

TortsNegligenceAssumption of RiskExculpatory AgreementsBorrowed Servantstunt injurynegligenceproximate cause

Facts

Plaintiff performed a stunt called the "Human Kite" and agreed to fly it over land for defendant television producer, relying on repeated assurances that defendant would furnish a highly qualified stunt driver. After plaintiff rejected the first proposed driver, defendant assigned Jerome Welo, who admitted he was not a driver and had never represented himself as a stunt driver, but who agreed to follow plaintiff's instructions to slow the tow car once the kite became airborne. According to plaintiff and supporting evidence, Welo drove too fast, causing the kite to rocket upward and then dive, seriously injuring plaintiff; experts who analyzed the film concluded excessive speed caused the accident. Plaintiff had also signed a brief written "Release Agreement" upon arrival, but it did not mention negligence and was presented after the oral deal had already been completed.

Issue

Whether substantial evidence supported findings that defendants were negligent and that their negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injuries; whether Welo's negligence was chargeable to defendants rather than plaintiff under borrowed-servant principles; whether plaintiff's signed release barred recovery for defendants' negligence; and whether plaintiff was barred by contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law.

Rule

Negligence and proximate cause are established where substantial evidence shows defendant furnished an incompetent driver and excessive speed caused the injury. A servant is not transformed into another's employee unless the original master fully relinquishes control; directions or signals necessary to cooperative work within a larger operation do not suffice. Exculpatory language will be strictly construed and will not relieve a party from liability for its own affirmative negligence unless the agreement clearly and explicitly expresses that intent. A plaintiff does not assume risks arising from negligence he has no reason to foresee, particularly where he relied on assurances of competence and safety, and taking a hazardous risk is contributory negligence only if an ordinarily prudent person would not have taken it in the circumstances.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Phoenix, aerial performer Nina Flores agreed to do a promotional glider stunt for Desert Lantern Media. During negotiations, the producer repeatedly assured her the company would provide a highly experienced tow-vehicle operator, so Nina left her usual operator in Nevada. The assigned operator was actually inexperienced and drove far beyond the agreed speed, causing Nina to crash.

If Nina sues for negligence, which argument by Desert Lantern Media is least likely to bar her recovery as a matter of law?

Explanation. The majority held that a plaintiff does not assume risks arising from negligence he had no reason to anticipate, especially where he relied on repeated assurances of competence and safety. Participation in a dangerous stunt does not automatically amount to assumption of risk or contributory negligence as a matter of law. Here, Nina could rely on the producer's promises about a qualified operator, so the negligent excessive speed was not necessarily a risk she assumed. (Derived from Woodall v. Wayne Steffner Productions (n.d.).)