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Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

Supreme Court of the United States · 2011 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFirst AmendmentCampaign FinancePublic Financing of ElectionsPolitical SpeechFirst Amendmentpolitical speechstrict scrutiny

Facts

Arizona created a voluntary public financing system for state candidates, but participating candidates who accepted public funds and related restrictions could receive additional matching funds when a privately financed opponent's spending or fundraising, or certain independent expenditures, exceeded the initial public grant. Once triggered, the publicly financed candidate received roughly one dollar for every additional dollar spent by the privately financed candidate, and also roughly one dollar for every dollar spent by independent groups supporting the privately financed candidate or opposing the publicly financed candidate. Matching funds could also multiply where one privately financed candidate faced multiple publicly financed opponents, and the funds were distributed automatically and directly to the participating candidates. Petitioners, consisting of candidates and independent expenditure groups, argued that this system burdened their speech by making their spending directly generate state subsidies for political adversaries.

Issue

Whether Arizona's matching funds provision, which awards additional public money to participating candidates in direct response to the campaign spending of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups, violates the First Amendment. Specifically, the question was whether this mechanism substantially burdens protected political speech and, if so, whether it is justified by a compelling state interest.

Rule

A state may engage in public financing of election campaigns, but it may not structure that financing so that a candidate's or independent group's political speech directly triggers additional subsidies to an opponent. When a law substantially burdens political speech by imposing such a penalty on campaign expenditures or independent expenditures, the law is subject to strict scrutiny and is unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state interest; interests in equalizing electoral opportunities are not legitimate justifications, and anticorruption interests do not justify burdening personal expenditures or independent expenditures that do not give rise to quid pro quo corruption.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

Colorado creates a voluntary public-financing program for candidates for secretary of state. Each participating candidate receives an initial grant, but once a nonparticipating opponent spends more than that amount, the state automatically transfers 95 cents to the participating opponent for every additional dollar spent.

If a nonparticipating candidate challenges the trigger provision, how should a court rule under the majority's doctrine?

Explanation. The majority distinguished public financing generally from a scheme that awards funds in direct response to an opponent's speech. When each additional dollar spent by a privately financed candidate automatically generates money for the adversary, the law imposes a substantial burden on political speech and is subject to strict scrutiny. The majority rejected the arguments that the absence of an expenditure cap, the voluntary nature of the program, or an increase in aggregate speech saves such a trigger mechanism.