Christensen v. Harris County

Supreme Court of the United States · 2000 · Administrative Law

529 U.S. 576 (2000)

Updated August 1, 2026

Administrative Lawinterpretive rulesdeferenceChevron deferenceSkidmore respectAuer deferenceopinion lettersforce of law

Facts

The petitioners were deputy sheriffs employed by Harris County who had individually agreed to accept compensatory time instead of cash for overtime. Concerned about the fiscal consequences of large accrued compensatory-time balances, the county asked the Department of Labor whether it could require employees to use accrued comp time. After receiving an opinion letter stating that compelled use was not permitted absent prior agreement, the county nevertheless adopted a policy allowing supervisors to order employees to take compensatory time when their accrued hours approached a set maximum. The employees sued, arguing that the FLSA prohibited compelled use absent an agreement authorizing it.

Issue

Whether a public employer governed by 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) may, absent a preexisting agreement, require employees to use accrued compensatory time. Also, whether the Department of Labor's contrary opinion letter or regulation was entitled to deference.

Rule

The FLSA does not expressly or implicitly prohibit a public employer from requiring employees to use accrued compensatory time absent an agreement addressing compelled use. Agency interpretations in opinion letters and similar informal formats do not receive Chevron-style deference and are entitled only to Skidmore respect to the extent they are persuasive; Auer deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is unavailable when the regulation is unambiguous.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The Oregon Department of Labor sends an opinion letter to Cascadia Transit Authority in Portland stating that a federal wage statute bars a public employer from assigning workers to use already-accrued compensatory time unless a prior agreement expressly allows it. The statute itself is silent on forced use, and the letter was not issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.

If bus mechanics sue and argue the court must accept the agency's interpretation under Chevron, how should the court rule?

Explanation. The majority distinguished between interpretations with the force of law and informal guidance. Opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines do not receive Chevron-style deference. They receive only Skidmore respect to the extent they have the power to persuade.