Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corporation

New York Court of Appeals · 1980 · Torts

51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980)

Updated July 23, 2026

TortsNegligenceProximate CauseIntervening and Superseding Causelegal causesuperseding causeintervening actforeseeability

Facts

Felix Contracting Corporation was installing an underground gas main and plaintiff Derdiarian, employed by subcontractor Bayside Pipe Coaters, was sealing the main at the excavation site. The site was in the eastbound lane of a two-lane road, and plaintiff testified that Felix's foreman instructed him to keep his truck on the west side of the excavation, where he then placed a kettle of 400-degree liquid enamel near the curb. Dickens, who was under treatment for epilepsy and had neglected to take his medication at the proper time, suffered a seizure while driving eastbound, lost consciousness, crashed through a single wooden barricade, entered the work site, struck plaintiff and the kettle, and caused severe burns. Plaintiff offered expert testimony that accepted safety practice required a protective barrier covering the excavation, two flagmen rather than one, and warning signs.

Issue

Whether, as a matter of law, Dickens' negligent loss of control of his vehicle was a superseding cause that broke the causal link between Felix's allegedly inadequate work-site safety precautions and plaintiff's injuries. Also, whether plaintiff failed as a matter of law to show that Felix's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.

Rule

A plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of legal cause by showing that defendant's negligence was a substantial cause of the events producing the injury. An intervening act does not automatically sever causation; liability turns on whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by defendant's negligence. Only when the intervening act is extraordinary, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from defendant's conduct may it be treated as a superseding cause as a matter of law. The precise manner of the accident or the exact extent of injury need not be foreseeable.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Buffalo, Ridgeway Utility Services opened a trench in the curb lane of a busy street but protected it only with a lightweight folding sign. While texting, Naomi Kerr drifted into the lane, knocked over the sign, and struck Omar Vega, who was working inside the trench.

If Omar sues Ridgeway for negligence, which is the strongest argument against Ridgeway's claim that Naomi's conduct was a superseding cause as a matter of law?

Explanation. A defendant remains liable where its negligence was a substantial cause of the events producing the injury and the intervening act was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the risk created. If a driver entering an inadequately protected work area is the very hazard that made the precautions deficient, the driver's negligence does not supersede liability as a matter of law. The exact manner of negligent driving need not be foreseen.