Doe v. Johnson

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 · Torts

Tortsfoster careintentional infliction of emotional distressnegligencesupplemental jurisdictionjury instructionsproximate causemissing witness

Facts

Plaintiffs sued on behalf of Jane Doe, alleging that her foster parents physically and sexually abused her and that the foster care agency and its employee were negligent in placing and supervising her foster placement. At trial, plaintiffs sought damages for psychological treatment expenses and presented several experts, including testimony about another foster child, Doe's drawings, and a psychiatrist's opinions. The district court limited some expert testimony, admitted state and CWLA foster-care standards, allowed a defense expert to testify, gave proximate-cause and missing witness/evidence instructions, and refused to allow late admission of Doe's drawings or undisclosed testimony about future medical needs. The jury found for defendants on all claims.

Issue

Whether the district court abused its discretion or otherwise committed reversible error in its evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and denial of a new trial after a defense verdict in a foster-care abuse and negligence case. More specifically, the appeal challenged limits on expert testimony, use of the short-form proximate-cause instruction, missing witness/evidence instructions, admission of foster-care standards, refusal to reopen proofs, exclusion of undisclosed expert opinions, and alleged improper closing argument.

Rule

Evidentiary rulings, decisions whether to reopen proofs, Rule 37 discovery sanctions, and denial of a new trial are reviewed for abuse of discretion; jury instructions are reviewed as a whole to determine whether they fairly and accurately informed the jury and caused prejudice. A party forfeits or waives appellate review by failing to support arguments with authority, failing to make timely and specific objections under Rule 51 and Rule 103, or by proposing the challenged instruction. In Illinois, regulations, standards, and by-laws may be admitted as evidence of custom or standard of care, and a missing-evidence adverse inference is permissible where the evidence would surely have been produced if favorable and no satisfactory excuse for nonproduction is shown.

🔒

See the holding & full analysis

Create a free KwikCourt account to unlock the rest of this brief — and practice the case.

The court's holding and reasoning
Doctrine tests, pitfalls & exam hypotheticals
10 practice questions + 4 AI-graded essays on this case

Free sample · practice this case

Test yourself

One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In a negligence trial in Milwaukee, Nora Patel sues Lakeview Transit Services and two drivers after a chain-reaction collision. At the charge conference, Nora's lawyer says only that he prefers the longer proximate-cause pattern instruction because it is "more complete," and the judge gives the shorter version; the jury returns a defense verdict.

On appeal, Nora argues the short instruction was misleading because multiple actors may have contributed to her injury. What is the strongest response?

Explanation. Under Rule 51, a party must object before the jury retires and must state distinctly both the matter objected to and the grounds. A general statement that counsel prefers a different instruction is insufficient. The majority held that a similarly nonspecific objection forfeited appellate review, even where the appellant later argued the short instruction was problematic in a multi-actor case. (Derived from Doe v. Johnson (n.d.).)