Harrison v. Wisdom

Supreme Court of Tennessee · Torts

Tortspublic necessityevidencejudicial disqualificationpublic necessitypolice powerdestruction of propertyimminent peril

Facts

After the surrender of Fort Donelson, Clarksville citizens held a public meeting to consider measures for protecting the city from an expected immediate occupation by Federal forces. Believing that liquor in the city would endanger lives and property if seized by victorious soldiers, the meeting resolved to destroy spirituous liquors and to seek reimbursement for owners through a special tax. Plaintiff owned whisky, brandy, and wine in the city, and after being told of the meeting's resolution by an appointed agent, he gave his key to his clerk so the liquor could be delivered and destroyed. At trial, plaintiff sought to introduce testimony about what defendants or their agents said and did at other locations during the destruction campaign and what the agent said while plaintiff's liquor was being destroyed, but the court excluded that evidence and also excluded a witness who had a similar pending suit.

Issue

Whether defendants could avoid liability for destroying plaintiff's liquor on the ground of public necessity, and whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of acts and declarations by defendants and their agents during execution of the common plan and in excluding a witness whose interest was only in the legal question. A further issue was whether the trial judge was disqualified merely because he had been present at the citizens' meeting.

Rule

Private property may be destroyed for the public good, without liability for its value, only in cases of overruling necessity. To justify the destruction, the facts must show an impending and imminent peril, or reasonable and substantial grounds for apprehending such peril, so that the destruction is absolutely necessary for public safety and not based on imaginary danger or unsubstantial panic. In proving or disputing such justification, once a common design is shown, acts and declarations of participants or agents made during the enterprise and in furtherance of its object are admissible against all; and a witness is not incompetent merely because he has an interest in the question to be decided rather than in the event of the cause itself.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

In Savannah, residents learned that a hostile militia had entered a county 80 miles away. Without any reports of movement toward the city, a volunteer committee broke into Noah Bennett’s warehouse and destroyed barrels of lamp oil, saying they feared marauders might someday use them to start fires. Bennett sues for conversion and trespass.

Which is the strongest argument that the committee cannot rely on public necessity?

Explanation. The majority treated public necessity as a narrow common-law justification requiring an actual extraordinary emergency: an impending and imminent peril, or reasonable and substantial grounds for apprehending such peril, making destruction absolutely necessary for public safety. Mere unsubstantial panic or imaginary danger is insufficient. The other choices misstate the doctrine; the opinion expressly distinguished public necessity from eminent domain and did not condition the defense on refusal to sell or illegality of ownership. (Derived from Harrison v. Wisdom (n.d.).)