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Hernandez v. Texas

Supreme Court of the United States · 1954 · Constitutional Law
Constitutional LawEqual ProtectionJury DiscriminationFourteenth AmendmentEqual Protection Clausejury selectiongrand jurypetit jury

Facts

Before trial, Hernandez moved to quash the indictment and jury panel, alleging that persons of Mexican descent were systematically excluded from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors in Jackson County despite the presence of qualified persons in that group. Evidence showed that the community distinguished between "white" and "Mexican," that participation by persons of Mexican descent in community life was slight, that children of Mexican descent had until recently attended a segregated school for the first four grades, that a restaurant displayed a "No Mexicans Served" sign, and that a courthouse toilet was marked "Colored Men" and "Hombres Aqui." Hernandez also showed that about 14% of the county population and about 11% of adult males had Mexican or Latin-American surnames, that 6 or 7% of freeholders were persons of Mexican descent, and that for 25 years no person with a Mexican or Latin-American name had served on a jury commission, grand jury, or petit jury in Jackson County. The State stipulated that some persons of Mexican or Latin-American descent in the county were legally eligible for such service.

Issue

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from systematically excluding persons of Mexican descent from jury commissions, grand juries, and petit juries. More specifically, whether Hernandez established that persons of Mexican descent were a distinct class in Jackson County and that they were discriminatorily excluded from jury service.

Rule

The Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to a two-class white-and-Negro theory; when a distinct class is shown to exist in a community, and the laws as written or applied single out that class for different treatment not based on a reasonable classification, equal protection is violated. The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or national origin is unconstitutional, and a prima facie case may be established by showing that the class forms a substantial part of the community, that some members are qualified for jury service, and that none have served over an extended period.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
In Santa Fe, New Mexico, Diego Marquez moves to quash his indictment, arguing that people of Andean ancestry are excluded from jury service. He proves that local officials and business owners routinely refer to residents as either "Anglo" or "Andean," that an Andean social club is excluded from city civic events, and that one downtown café posts a sign stating "Andeans Not Welcome."

Under the governing equal protection rule, what is the strongest conclusion from this evidence?

Explanation. The majority held that the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined to a two-class white-and-Black theory. Whether a group exists as a distinct class in a particular community is a question of fact, and one way to prove it is by showing community attitudes and practices that distinguish the group from others. Evidence of local labeling and social exclusion is therefore relevant and sufficient to satisfy the distinct-class step, though Diego would still need to prove discriminatory exclusion from jury service.