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Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego

Supreme Court of California · 1982 · Constitutional Law

Constitutional LawFirst AmendmentSeverabilityStatutory Constructionbillboardsoff-site signscommercial speechnoncommercial speech

Facts

San Diego enacted an ordinance that, with certain exceptions, banned erection of off-site billboards within the city and required removal of existing off-site billboards after an amortization period. Section B permitted only signs identifying the premises or advertising goods or services produced or rendered on the premises, while section F created 12 narrow exceptions, including temporary political campaign signs. The United States Supreme Court held that the ordinance's prohibition on noncommercial billboards violated the First Amendment and remanded for consideration whether the ordinance could be salvaged by limiting its reach to commercial speech or by severing unconstitutional portions. San Diego urged the California Supreme Court either to construe the ordinance as applying only to commercial signs or to sever language that indirectly and directly prohibited noncommercial messages.

Issue

After the United States Supreme Court held the ordinance unconstitutional insofar as it prohibited noncommercial billboards, could the California Supreme Court save the ordinance by fairly construing it to apply only to commercial off-site signs or by severing the unconstitutional portions while leaving a valid remainder?

Rule

A statute or ordinance should be construed to preserve constitutionality if, within the bounds of its words and purposes, it is fairly and reasonably capable of a constitutional meaning. But a court may not rewrite legislation under the guise of interpretation. Even where an enactment contains a severability clause and invalid portions are mechanically severable, severance is proper only if the remainder is complete in itself, operative, and one the legislative body would have adopted had it foreseen the partial invalidation.

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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.

The city council of Phoenix enacts a sign ordinance allowing only signs that identify the premises or advertise goods and services offered there. A separate section exempts temporary election signs for 45 days before an election and several commemorative plaques. After a court holds that the ordinance may not prohibit noncommercial messages, the city asks the court to construe the term "display signs" to mean only commercial signs.

How should the court rule on the city's proposed limiting construction?

Explanation. A court may preserve legislation through interpretation only when the enactment is fairly and reasonably susceptible to the proposed constitutional meaning within its words and purposes. Here, the separate exemptions for election signs and similar noncommercial messages show that the ordinance as written covers noncommercial signs. Under the majority's reasoning, recasting the law as commercial-only would conflict with its language and structure and would amount to judicial amendment, not interpretation. (Derived from Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego (n.d.).)