The case concerns the citizenship status of Morales-Santana under statutory provisions governing children born abroad to one U.S.-citizen parent and one foreign-citizen parent. The Supreme Court concluded that the gender-based distinction in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a) and (c) violated equal protection. It also concluded, however, that the favorable exception for unwed U.S.-citizen mothers could not be extended to become the governing rule. On remand, the question was whether Morales-Santana qualified as a United States citizen under the longer physical-presence requirement.
Issue
After the Supreme Court held the statutory gender-based distinction unconstitutional but directed that the longer physical-presence requirement must apply, was Morales-Santana a United States citizen under the governing statutory scheme?
Rule
Although the gender-based distinction in the relevant citizenship statutes violates equal protection, the proper remedy is not to extend the favorable exception for unwed U.S.-citizen mothers. Instead, the longer physical-presence requirement in § 1401(a)(7), applicable to the substantial majority of children born abroad to one U.S.-citizen parent and one foreign-citizen parent, governs.
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One of 10 multiple-choice questions for this case. Pick an answer to see why.
Leila Navarro was born in Lima, Peru, to Sofia Navarro, a U.S. citizen, and Diego Ramos, a Peruvian citizen. A federal court later holds unconstitutional a citizenship statute that gave unwed U.S.-citizen mothers a shorter physical-presence requirement than other U.S.-citizen parents, and Leila argues the shorter requirement must now be applied to all similarly situated children.
How should a court resolve Leila's argument?
Explanation. The controlling doctrine is that identifying an unconstitutional gender-based distinction does not automatically entitle the excluded class to the more favorable treatment. Where extending the favorable exception would convert an exception into the main rule and displace the broader statutory scheme, the longer physical-presence requirement remains controlling. (Derived from Morales-Santana v. Sessions (n.d.).)