Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps
Facts
The Philadelphia Inquirer published five articles stating, in substance, that Maurice Hepps, his corporation, and related businesses had links to organized crime and had used those links to influence Pennsylvania governmental processes. In the defamation action that followed, Pennsylvania law placed on the defendant the burden of proving the truth of defamatory statements, based on the common-law presumption that defamatory statements are false. The trial court, however, ruled that this allocation violated the Federal Constitution and instructed the jury that plaintiffs bore the burden of proving falsity, and the jury returned a verdict for appellants. During trial, appellants also invoked Pennsylvania's shield law to refuse to disclose sources, but no instruction was given on adverse or nonadverse inferences from that invocation.
Issue
When a private-figure plaintiff seeks damages from a media defendant for allegedly defamatory speech on a matter of public concern, does the First Amendment require the plaintiff to bear the burden of proving the falsity of the statements? Put differently, may a State retain the common-law rule presuming defamatory speech false and requiring the defendant to prove truth in that setting?
Rule
At least where a media defendant publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages for defamation without showing that the statements at issue are false. In that setting, the First Amendment does not permit the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false or a rule placing on the defendant the burden of proving truth.
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Which statement best describes the constitutional validity of that burden allocation?